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NEW TECHNOLOGY, OLD PROBLEM: DETERMINING THE




In the battle over free speech on electronic information services, Prod-
igy Information Services Corporation has been besieged from all sides.
In 1990, a group of subscribers to the computerized information system
complained that Prodigy had placed too many restrictions on the volume
and content of electronic mail messages, inhibiting communication on
the system.' In 1991, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and
others contended that Prodigy had in fact placed too few restrictions on
its electronic mail and bulletin board services, permitting users to post
"hate mail" directed at racial and ethnic groups.2 In 1993, another
group of subscribers alleged that an electronic forum established for the
discussion of alternative lifestyles had become overwhelmed by explicit
sexual banter, prompting Prodigy to cancel the service.3
Although certain aspects of Prodigy's predicament may be unique to
its status as the operator of an electronic information service ("EIS"), the
conflict at the core of the problem is really nothing new. As a pioneering
participant in a new type of communications service, Prodigy is caught in
the same fundamental First Amendment struggle that has shaped the
development of other "emerging" media-including telephone, radio,
broadcast television, and, more recently, cable television. Like Prodigy
and other EIS operators, those who own and control these more estab-
lished media have had to struggle to stake out their status under the First
Amendment.4 More specifically, at some point in their development,
most of these media have sought to secure the sort of "full" First
Amendment protection that is afforded to print publishers-the fullest
freedom from regulation afforded by the First Amendment's proscrip-
tions against government restrictions on free speech and freedom of the
press.5
1. See Dean Takahashi, Prodigy Invites Ex-Subscribers Back Into Fold, L.A. Times,
Nov. 22, 1990, at D5.
2. See John Schwartz, A Screenful of Venom, Newsweek, Nov. 4, 1991, at 48.
3. See Sex Talk Prompts Prodigy to Shutter Bulletin Board, Chi. Trib., Feb. 1, 1993,
Business Section, at 2.
4. See infra notes 103-25 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the
First Amendment status of telephone companies); notes 126-83 and accompanying text
(discussing the development of the First Amendment status of broadcasters); notes 184-
293 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the First Amendment status
of cable television operators).
5. See, e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748
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A critical determination often comes fairly early on in this struggle,
when Congress or the courts decide whether those that operate a new
medium will be categorized as publishers, common carriers,6 broadcast-
ers, or some sort of hybrid. For Prodigy and other electronic informa-
tion services, at least one court has already tried to reach this
determination. In Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,' a federal district
court ruled that the operator of an EIS should be treated as a distributor
rather than as a publisher, at least for establishing liability under state
libel law.8
This Note considers whether Cubby and related rulings set the correct
course for regulating electronic information services. Parts I and II be-
gin more generally, however, by examining how courts can condone any
government regulation of media at all, given the First Amendment's ap-
parent blanket ban of such governmental interference with free speech
and a free press, and the various categories into which the regulations
that have survived constitutional scrutiny tend to fall. Part III then
draws several historical analogies, noting how the tension between First
Amendment concerns and government regulation has influenced the
growth of three relatively mature technologies: telephone, radio and tele-
vision broadcasting, and cable television. Finally, this Note concludes
with some specific recommendations for applying these historical lessons
to the regulation of electronic information services.
I. REGULATING ELECTRONIC MEDIA UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: AN OVERVIEW
The First Amendment insists that Congress "make no law .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."9 Despite this con-
stitutional prohibition, however, Congress and the states' 0 have in
fact "made" a variety of laws that abridge the freedoms of speech and
press-and that courts have accepted as reasonable restrictions on
these First Amendment freedoms. For example, the United States
Supreme Court has held constitutional laws that limit or prohibit
(1978) ("[A]lthough the First Amendment protects newspaper publishers from being re-
quired to print the replies of those whom they criticize, it affords no such protection to
broadcasters") (citation omitted); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 258 (1974) ("The choice of material to go into a newspaper ... constitute[s] the
exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how govern-
mental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with [the] First
Amendment....").
6. The term "common carrier" is defined infra note 109 and accompanying text.
7. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
8. See id. at 139-41.
9. U.S. Const. amend. I (emphasis added).
10. Although the First Amendment itself speaks only to Congress and not to state
legislatures, the First Amendment guarantees are among the "fundamental personal
rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
1148 [Vol. 61
NEW TECHNOLOGY, OLD PROBLEM
obscene speech,1" "fighting words,"' 2 and certain types of commercial
speech.13  Moreover, and more important for this discussion, the
Supreme Court has upheld a number of laws and regulations that place
special burdens on the First Amendment rights of those that own and
program radio and television stations, cable television systems, and other
electronic communications services.' 4
As a general rule, any government restriction on the content of consti-
tutionally protected speech is subject to strict constitutional scrutiny.' 5
That is, courts will require that the law or regulation in question be very
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 6 When the re-
strictions are directed toward the content carried on electronic communi-
cations media, however, a less stringent standard sometimes applies. For
example, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Com-
mission, 7 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the "Fair-
ness Doctrine" through which the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) requires broadcasters to provide a right of reply to certain individ-
uals and groups--even though, as the Court subsequently ruled, such a
right of reply requirement is clearly unconstitutional when applied to
print media."8 Similarly, in Federal Communications Commission v.
Pacifica Foundation,9 the Court upheld the FCC's right to sanction a
radio station for broadcasting a comedy routine containing "indecent"
language-even though the same language would probably have enjoyed
11. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
12. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
13. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328(1986).
14. See e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978) (upholding FCC's authority to regulate indecent broadcast speech under § 1464 of
the U.S. Penal Code); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine, an FCC
regulatory policy requiring broadcast licensees to report on issues of local concern and to
do so fairly); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding
FCC's statutory and regulatory authority to license broadcasters in the public interest).
15. Strict scrutiny applies when the regulation in question restricts the content of
protected speech. See e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Federal Communica-
tions Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("The government may... regulate the content
of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses
the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.") (emphasis added). How-
ever, when the government attempts instead to regulate the time, place, or manner of
speech, or when a regulation implicates "speech conduct" or purely commercial speech, a
somewhat more relaxed standard applies. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (to survive constitutional scrutiny, a time, place,
or manner restriction must be "content-neutral... [and] narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest") (emphasis added).
16. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
17. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
18. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (rejecting as
unconstitutional a Florida "right of reply" statute requiring newspapers to provide polit-
ical candidates with the opportunity to respond to attacks on their public records or
personal characters).
19. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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full First Amendment protection if published in print.2" As these cases
illustrate, in the Supreme Court's view at least, "differences in the char-
acteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment stan-
dards applied to them."21
A. The Red Lion "Scarcity" Rationale
The Supreme Court has cited several reasons for drawing distinctions
between electronic and print media under the First Amendment. In Red
Lion, for example, the Court focused on the fact that, unlike print pub-
lishers, broadcasters operate on frequencies assigned to them under a
government license.22 For this reason, the Court concluded that "the
First Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent others from
broadcasting on 'their' frequencies and no right to an unconditional mo-
nopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied others the
right to use."23 This argument is also known as the "scarcity rationale,"
since it is based on the assumption that broadcast channels are a scarce
public resource and that, in exchange for receiving the exclusive right to
exploit such a valuable public commodity, broadcasters should both ex-
pect and accept regulation intended to insure that they operate in the
public interest.
B. The Pacifica "Intrusiveness" Rationale
In Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,24 the
Supreme Court followed a different line of reasoning in distinguishing
broadcast and print media under the First Amendment. Pacifica in-
volved the FCC's attempt to sanction25 a radio station operator for
broadcasting a comedy monologue that, in the Commission's opinion,
violated section 1464 of the U.S. Penal Code26 -the provision that pro-
hibits the transmission of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
20. See id. at 746.
21. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367,
386 (1969) (footnote omitted); see also Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984) (noting that "because broadcast regulation in-
volves unique considerations, our cases have not followed precisely the same approach
that we have applied to other media and have never gone so far as to demand that such
regulations serve 'compelling' governmental interests"); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego,
453 U.S. 490, 501 n.8 (1980) (observing that "[t]he uniqueness of each medium of expres-
sion has been a frequent refrain" in Supreme Court opinions involving the First
Amendment).
22. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-89.
23. Id. at 391.
24. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
25. As the Supreme Court observed, the FCC did not actually impose formal sanc-
tions on the Pacifica Foundation, the operator of the radio station, "but it did state that
the order [granting the complaint] would be 'associated with the station's license file, and
in the event that subsequent complaints are received, the Commission will then decide
whether it should utilize any of the available sanctions it has been granted by Congress.'"
Id. at 730 (quoting 56 F.C.C.2d, at 99).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988).
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means of radio communications." 27 Significantly, the Supreme Court
concluded that the language at issue constituted indecent speech under
section 1464 and the current constitutional standard, rather than obscene
speech that is outside the protection of the First Amendment.28 Never-
theless, the Court upheld the FCC's right to sanction broadcasters for
transmitting such speech, even while acknowledging that similar govern-
ment interference would be unconstitutional if the same material was dis-
seminated in a print publication.29
In justifying this distinction, the Court explained that it had "long rec-
ognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amend-
ment problems. . . . [a]nd of all forms of communication, it is
broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment pro-
tection."30 In this instance, however, the Court did not focus on the fact
that broadcasters operate under a government license, as it had in Red
Lion. Rather, the Court concentrated on the peculiar characteristics of
the medium itself, pointing first to the "uniquely pervasive presence" that
the broadcast media have established in the lives of all Americans.3 To
the Court, this "pervasive presence" meant that "indecent material
presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but
also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left
alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.
3 2
As further support for its position, the Court cited a second distin-
guishing characteristic of broadcasting: its unique accessibility to chil-
dren.33 In this sense, the broadcast media are distinct from many other
forms of communication in that offensive expression disseminated
through other media may be withheld from the young "without restrict-
ing the expression at its source"' 34 (for example, by restricting access to a
movie theater displaying "adult" films to those of a certain age, rather
than by restraining distribution of the film itself). In contrast, because
broadcast programming becomes instantly available to children by sim-
ply switching on a radio or television, the only effective way to limit chil-
dren's access to offensive or indecent broadcast material is to place
restraints on its transmission.
C. The Sable Standard
Pacifica is especially noteworthy because, read broadly, it would per-
mit government regulation based on the peculiar characteristics of the
communications system or service in question, regardless of whether the
27. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1464).
28. See id. at 745.
29. See id. at 741.
30. Id. at 748 (citation omitted).
31. Id
32. Id




system or service operates under a government license. This raises the
specter of the government reviewing each new communications service
that comes along to determine if it threatens to be so pervasive or intru-
sive as to warrant preemptive government regulation.
In fact, it was just this sort of preemptive government strike that was
at issue in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Federal Commu-
nications Commission," a 1989 Supreme Court case that considered the
constitutionality of federal legislation aimed at restricting children's ac-
cess to "dial-a-porn" telephone sevices.36 The federal law in question37
amended section 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 to ban both
obscene and indecent communications transmitted over interstate tele-
phone lines for commercial purposes. Although the express purpose of
section 223(b), as originally enacted, was to prevent minors from gaining
access to sexually explicit messages,38 the total ban required under the
amended statute would have effectively put Sable Communications and
other dial-a-porn providers out of business.
In reviewing the statute, the Supreme Court quickly concluded that
the section banning obscene messages was constitutional, since obscenity
is not protected speech under the First Amendment. 39 But the Court
had much more trouble with the part of the law prohibiting those
messages that were merely indecent. Lawyers for the government argued
that such a ban on indecent telecommunications could withstand consti-
tutional scrutiny, pointing to Pacifica as support for this proposition.4 °
The Court disagreed, however, noting that Pacifica was distinguishable
on several grounds. First, the FCC rule challenged in Pacifica did not
involve a total ban on a particular type of communication, as was the
case with the dial-a-porn legislation at issue in Sable. Rather, it was an
attempt to "channel" objectionable material to a time of day when chil-
35. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
36. The Supreme Court described the service provided by Sable Communications as
follows:
In 1983, Sable Communications, Inc., a Los Angeles-based affiliate of Carlin
Communications, Inc., began offering sexually oriented prerecorded telephone
messages (popularly known as "dial-a-porn") through the Pacific Bell telephone
network. In order to provide the messages, Sable arranged with Pacific Bell to
use special telephone lines, designed to handle large volumes of calls simultane-
ously. Those who called the adult message number were charged a special fee.
The fee was collected by Pacific Bell and divided between the phone company
and the message provider. Callers outside the Los Angeles metropolitan area
could reach the number by means of a long-distance toll call to the Los Angeles
area code.
Id. at 117-18 (footnote omitted). The Court also noted that "[d]ial-a-porn is big business.
The dial-a-porn service in New York City alone received six to seven million calls a
month .... Id. at 120 n.3.
37. Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Im-
provement Amendments of 1988, Pub L. No. 100-297, 102 Stat. 130, 424 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988)).
38. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 120.
39. See id. at 124.
40. See id. at 127.
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dren would be less likely to be tuning in.4 Second, and most important
for this discussion, the Court distinguished the media involved in the two
cases on technical grounds, observing that:
[t]he Pacifica opinion also relied on the "unique" attributes of broad-
casting, noting that broadcasting is "uniquely pervasive," can intrude
on the privacy of the home without prior warning as to program con-
tent, and is "uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to
read." The private commercial telephone communications at issue
here are substantially different from the public radio broadcast at issue
in Pacifica. In contrast to public displays, unsolicited mailings and
other means of expression which the recipient has no meaningful op-
portunity to avoid, the dial-it medium requires the listener to take af-
firmative steps to receive the communication.'
2
Given this distinction between broadcast and telephone technology, and
given the availability of less restrictive means for limiting children's ac-
cess to dial-a-porn, the Court concluded that the part of the statute
prohibiting indecent communications did not survive constitutional
scrutiny.43
D. First Amendment Parameters: How Far Can the Government Go?
Red Lion, Pacifica, and Sable suggest some parameters for gauging
how far the government may go in regulating electronic communications
media. First, as Red Lion indicates, 44 the government can go farthest
when the media entity in question is licensed to transmit over the public
airwaves. When this is the case, the scarcity rationale applies, and the
government may impair the First Amendment rights of the communica-
tor to promote the public interest.4" Second, as Pacifica shows, the gov-
ernment can place reasonable restraints on the transmission of indecent
or offensive program material, regardless of whether the transmitting en-
tity operates under a government license, to prevent unreasonable intru-
sions on the privacy or quietude of individual viewers and listeners.46
Finally, Sable suggests that the government's right to regulate under the
Pacifica "intrusiveness" rationale varies in degree, depending in part on
the nature of the technology involved.47
In fact, Pacifica and Sable can be seen as setting out a sort of "spec-
41. See i.
42. Id (citation omitted).
43. See id at 131.
44. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969).
45. As discussed further in the text accompanying note 175, infra, a growing number
of analysts and legal scholars believe that the scarcity rationale no longer applies in the
current, more competitive media marketplace.
46. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748
(1978).
47. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 492
U.S. 115, 127-28 (1989).
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trum of intrusiveness" for electronic media. At the farthest, most intru-
sive end of the spectrum are broadcast services that arrive in the home
unsolicited, providing viewers or listeners with little prior warning or
protection against unexpected program content.48 At the other, least in-
trusive end are services such as dial-a-porn and "pay-per-view ' 49 that
require some sort of initiating act or intervention to trigger each trans-
mission. Somewhere in the middle lie cable television channels such as
Home Box Office that subscribers must initially ask to have added to
their cable service, but that are then readily available to anyone, includ-
ing any child, who switches on the television set.50
II. CATEGORIES OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
From a First Amendment perspective, most laws and regulations af-
fecting electronic media fall into one of three categories: content regula-
tion, access regulation, and ownership regulation. Reviewing these
categories should provide some additional insight into the reasons for
and limits of government regulation of the media. This review should
also help establish a framework for the discussion of specific technologies
that follows.
A. Content Regulation
Content regulation occurs when the government attempts to en-
courage or to discourage the transmission of a particular type of program
material.5 Most often, as Pacifica illustrates, the content in question is
obscene or indecent material, and the government assumes the role of
"discourager" to protect sensitive members of the listening or viewing
public.52 Conversely, the government also encourages the transmission
of certain content that is considered beneficial to the public, most notably
through the broad FCC rules requiring broadcasters to carry a mix of
programming that meets the information and entertainment needs of the
48. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
49. Pay-per-view is a service currently delivered over cable television systems that
"allows viewers to order individual programs and pay for them on a per-view basis."
James C. Goodale, All About Cable: Legal and Business Aspects of Cable and Pay Tele-
vision § 5.05[2] (1992).
50. See Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (1lth Cir. 1985) (discussed infra in text accom-
panying notes 256-67).
51. As discussed in note 15, supra, content regulation is the category of government
regulation that is subject to the strictest form of constitutional scrutiny.
52. One recent example of the government acting to discourage allegedly indecent
material (and one recent reminder that the Pacifica standard is alive and well) is the
$105,000 fine that the FCC levied in October, 1992, against a Los Angeles radio station
for its broadcast of sexually explicit comments by syndicated "shock jock" Howard
Stern. In this instance, the Commission went much further than it had in Pacifica, actu-
ally levying a fine against the Los Angeles station and threatening to delay the planned
acquisition of several additional radio outlets by the station's parent corporation. See
Edmund L. Andrews, F C. C. Torn Over Howard Stern Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1992,
at D14.
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communities that they are licensed to serve.5 3 In addition, the Fairness
Doctrine and Equal Time Provision, discussed below as examples of ac-
cess regulation, can also be considered forms of content regulation
through which the government encourages broadcasters to carry issues-
oriented programming that reflects community concerns and interests.
One type of content that the government definitely discourages as be-
ing contrary to the public interest is cigarette advertising. Since 1971, a
federal statute has prohibited cigarette commercials on radio and televi-
sion.54 Prior to the passage of that statute, however, the FCC had made
running cigarette advertising problematic for broadcasters by ruling that
cigarette ads on radio and television were subject to the Fairness Doc-
trine.55 In reaching this determination, the FCC had reasoned that, be-
cause cigarette smoking was a controversial issue of public importance,
and because cigarette advertising promoted smoking "as attractive and
enjoyable," the Fairness Doctrine required broadcasters who carried cig-
arette commercials to devote a "significant amount" of valuable airtime
to public service announcements or other programming that presented
the anti-smoking point of view. 6
The constitutionality of this FCC ruling was examined and ultimately
upheld in Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Commission,"' a case
worth noting in this discussion primarily for the distinction that the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia drew between broadcast
and print media. The broadcasters intervening in Banzhaf argued that
the FCC order applying the Fairness Doctrine to cigarette advertising on
radio and television should be barred because the same rule would be
unconstitutional if applied to print advertising." The Court of Appeals
disagreed, concluding that this special treatment of broadcasters could in
fact be accommodated under the First Amendment.5 9 Foreshadowing
53. See Federal Communications Commission, Report and Statement of Policy Res:
Commission en banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960). In this report, more
widely known as the 1960 Programming Policy Statement, the FCC formalized rules re-
quiring broadcasters to ascertain the information and entertainment needs of residents in
their service areas and to provide programming that, on balance, meets those needs. The
FCC's constitutional and statutory authority to establish these programming standards
was sustained in Henry v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir.
1962). In recent years, however, the FCC has relaxed its ascertainment and program-
ming requirements. See Action for Children's Television v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated, 932 F.2d 1504 (1991). Congressional
concern that this trend had left young viewers underserved resulted in one of the more
recent government efforts to encourage positive program content, the Children's Televi-
sion Act of 1990. This legislation is discussed in the text accompanying note 181, infra.
54. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 6, 84 Stat.
87, 89 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988)).
55. See Letter from Federal Communications Commission to Television Station
WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967). The Fairness Doctrine is discussed infra in notes 66-
78 and accompanying text.
56. See id. at 382.
57. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
58. See id. at 1099.
59. See id. at 1100.
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the Supreme Court's reasoning in Pacifica some nine years later, the
court observed that although "[t]he First Amendment is unmistakably
hostile to governmental controls over the content of the press,"'  there
may "be a meaningful distinction between ... media justifying different
treatment under the First Amendment. ' 61 In the court's view, a key dis-
tinction between broadcast and print media is that:
[w]ritten messages are not communicated unless they are read, and
reading requires an affirmative act. Broadcast messages, in contrast,
are "in the air." In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes
a citizen who does not know some part of a leading cigarette jingle by
heart. Similarly, an ordinary habitual television watcher can avoid
these commercials only by frequently leaving the room, changing the
channel, or doing some other such affirmative act. It is difficult to
calculate the subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda, which
may be heard even if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought
greater than the impact of the written word.62
To the Court of Appeals, then, broadcast messages are subject to special
content restrictions not only because they are so pervasive, as the
Supreme Court would later acknowledge in Pacifica, but also because
they are so potentially persuasive.63
B. Access Regulation
Through access regulation, the government attempts to open up com-
munication channels to a variety of voices and viewpoints. The leading
examples of access regulation are the Fairness Doctrine and its close
cousin, the Equal Time Provision." The leading case that considers the
constitutionality of this category of regulation is Red Lion.65
The Fairness Doctrine is an FCC rule66 that places a dual burden on
60. Id. (footnote omitted).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1100-01 (footnote omitted).
63. But see Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987) (rejecting
the notion "that it is the immediacy and the power of broadcasting that causes its differ-
ential treatment"). Writing for the court, Judge Bork was "unwilling to endorse an argu-
ment that makes the very effectiveness of speech the justification for according it less first
amendment protection." Id.
64. In contrast to the Fairness Doctrine, which is an uncodified rule that concerns the
coverage of controversial issues generally, the Equal Time Provision is a statutory re-
quirement that applies specifically to situations in which a station provides broadcast
time to candidates for public office. Codified as § 315(a) of the Communications Act of
1934, the Equal Time Provision requires any broadcast station that allows one candidate
access to its airtime and facilities to make the same opportunity available to other quali-
fied candidates for the same office. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988).
65. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
66. As discussed in note 67, infra, courts have held that the Fairness Doctrine is an
FCC-created rule, rather than a statutory requirement under the Communications Act of
1934, despite the fact that the Code of Federal Regulations states that "The Fairness
Doctrine is contained in section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
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broadcasters.6 7 First, the doctrine requires broadcasters to cover issues
of public concern in the local areas that they are licensed to serve. 68 Sec-
ond, the doctrine requires broadcasters to cover these controversial issues
fairly by presenting contrasting points of view. 69 The specific regulation
at issue in Red Lion was the "personal attack" rule-a subset of the Fair-
ness Doctrine requiring that, when an individual is personally attacked
as part of a broadcaster's coverage of controversial issues, the broad-
caster must notify the individual that the attack occurred and provide the
person with an opportunity to respond.70
The Fairness Doctrine raises First Amendment concerns because it in-
volves a government intrusion on a broadcaster's right to control the edi-
torial content of its programming. When the First Amendment speaker
is a newspaper or book publisher, this right of editorial control is consid-
ered nearly inviolable.71 In Red Lion, however, the Supreme Court de-
termined that this right is not nearly so inviolable when the speaker in
question is a broadcast licensee operating on a frequency assigned by the
government. When that is the case, and where "there are substantially
more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
amended." 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1991). Section 315(a), which does codify the "Equal
Time Provision" that requires broadcast licensees to provide equal access to candidates
for political office, states only that "[n]othing in the foregoing sentence [describing the
equal time requirements] shall be construed as relieving broadcasters... from the obliga-
tion imposed upon them under this chapter... to afford reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988)
(emphasis added). But that obligation is not made explicit in any other section of the
Communications Act of 1934.
67. The current status of the Fairness Doctrine is a matter of considerable doubt and
debate. In 1985, during the height of the deregulatory spirit that permeated the Reagan
Administration, an FCC report concluded that the Fairness Doctrine was an unnecessary
burden on broadcasters because it impeded rather than enhanced broadcast coverage of
controversial issues. See Federal Communications Commission, In re Inquiry into Sec-
tion 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fair-
ness Doctrine Obligation of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 147 (1985). Then, in
a matter that came to the D.C. Circuit as Syracuse Peace Council v. Federal Communica-
tions Comm'n, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990), the
FCC indicated its intent to abandon the doctrine altogether. In that case, the court
upheld the FCC's authority to decline to enforce the doctrine. As support for this posi-
tion, the court cited Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. Federal Communi-
cations Comm'n, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987), an
earlier D.C. Circuit decision in which the court ruled that, contrary to what many com-
mentators apparently believed, a 1959 amendment to § 315 of the Communications Act
of 1934 (the section that sets out the Equal Time Provision) had not in fact codified the
fairness doctrine. See Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 656. There have also been
several attempts by Congress to codify the doctrine, including the Fairness in Broadcast-
ing Act of 1987. See S. 742, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). That legislation was vetoed by
President Reagan, however, and Congress failed to override.
68. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 377.
69. See id.
70. See id at 373.
71. See generally Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (up-
holding newspaper's First Amendment challenge to Florida right-of-reply statute).
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allocate,"7 2 the Court concluded that "it is idle to posit an unabridgeable
First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every
individual to speak, write, or publish."73
To the Supreme Court, then, the Fairness Doctrine constitutes a per-
missible abridgement of the First Amendment rights of broadcast licen-
sees, since the doctrine promotes the "ends and purposes of the First
Amendment"74 by opening the airwaves to "others whose views should
be expressed on this unique medium."7 " In other words, in this particu-
lar First Amendment balancing act, "[i]t is the right of viewers and lis-
teners, not the right of broadcasters, which is paramount.1 76
Broadcasting is not the only medium that has been subjected to the
Fairness Doctrine, the Equal Time Provision, or some similar sort of ac-
cess regulation. In the 1970s, for example, the FCC promulgated rules
requiring cable systems of a certain size to provide public, educational,
and government access channels.77 And in 1986, in an opinion written
by Judge Bork, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled
that teletext, a new technology that transmits information over an un-
used portion of the television signal, was itself subject to the Fairness
Doctrine.78 Further, as discussed in the sections that follow, the govern-
ment has attempted to promote comparable access goals through regulat-
ing the ownership and structure of communications services.
C. Ownership Regulation
One assumption that underlies the First Amendment, and one precept
that is fundamental to all government regulation of broadcasting and
telecommunications, is that "the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of
the public."79 As just discussed, one way that government attempts to
further this purpose is through the Fairness Doctrine and Equal Time
Provision. Another way is through media ownership regulations in-
tended to promote the "diversification of programming sources and
viewpoints."80
72. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 390.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689,
691-95 (1979) (summarizing the FCC's cable access rules).
78. See Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 801 F.2d 501, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987) (discussed
at length in the text accompanying notes 312-23 infra).
79. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also Federal Commu-
nications Comm'n v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795
(1978) (holding that it was proper for the FCC "to conclude that the maximum benefit to
the 'public interest' would follow from allocation of broadcast licenses so as to promote
diversification of the mass media as a whole").
80. Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Amendment of Sections
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Although some media ownership restrictions are statutory, including
the prohibition against foreigners obtaining broadcast licenses,8 most are
the result of FCC rulemaking and regulatory discretion. Consequently,
the scope and impact of media ownership rules have varied over the
years, depending on the regulatory mood in Washington generally and at
the FCC in particular. Because of this complex history, and because the
rules themselves tend to be quite technical, a complete review of media
ownership regulations is beyond the scope of this Note. For the purposes
of this discussion, it is enough to recognize that the government attempts
to further First Amendment "diversification" goals through quantitative
ownership and "cross ownership" guidelines that prevent any one entity
from owning too many media services in total and too many media out-
lets in any one market. For example, FCC regulations currently prevent
any one individual or corporation from owning more than twelve televi-
sion stations nationwide, 2 and the Cable Communications Act of 1984
prohibits any single entity from owning a television station and cable
television system that serve the same market.83 In addition, the FCC has
attempted to promote diversity in media ownership by giving preferential
treatment to women and minorities in granting broadcast licenses."4 As
these examples suggest, most media ownership restrictions target radio
and television stations-the media outlets over which the government
exercises the greatest degree of control through the licensing process, and
that of all the electronic media are generally perceived as the most pow-
erful and pervasive information purveyors.
D. Structural Regulation and Libel Liability
Two other types of government regulation of media raise First Amend-
ment concerns: structural regulation and libel law. Both types of regula-
tion deserve discussion, but neither really fits under any of the categories
described above. As a result, they are addressed separately here.
The first type, structural regulation, occurs when the government
73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of
Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 22 F.C.C.2d 306, 307 (1970).
81. See 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1988).
82. See Edmund L. Andrews, FCC Plan to Ease TV Owner Rule, N.Y. Times, May
15, 1992, at Dl. As the title of this Times article suggests, however, the FCC has pro-
posed changing its rules to increase the number of television stations that any one licensee
is permitted to own. The primary rationale for the proposed change is that new technolo-
gies such as cable television provide for more diversity of programming services, so that
restrictions on ownership of broadcast licenses are less necessary to achieve this goal. In
1992, the FCC did increase the number of radio stations that any one licensee can own
"to 18 AM and 18 FM stations from the current 12 each." Anthony Ramirez, A Com-
promise on Radio Station Ownership, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1992, at D1.
83. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(a) (1988).
84. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547
(1990) (upholding constitutionality of FCC minority ownership policies). But see Lam-
precht v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (concluding
that FCC licensing policy granting preferential treatment to women did not survive con-
stitutional scrutiny).
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designates a media service as a common carrier, broadcaster, publisher,
or some other category of communications service.85 As discussed more
specifically in the sections that follow, this structural designation carries
important First Amendment implications. For example, for most regula-
tory purposes, telephone systems are designated common carriers. This
means that they must provide public access to phone lines on a non-
discriminatory, "first-come, first-served" basis.16 It also means that tele-
phone companies have no real right to censor or to edit the messages
transmitted over their lines.87 In contrast, newspaper publishers are free
to exercise complete control over the editorial and advertising content
carried on their pages, even when their exercise of this discretion seems
capricious or discriminatory. 8
The second type of government regulation occurs when the courts en-
force state libel laws.89 Until the Supreme Court decided New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,9" libel was generally not considered a constitu-
tional issue.9 That is, like obscene speech or fighting words, libelous
statements were viewed as falling outside the area of speech protected by
the First Amendment.92 In Sullivan, however, the Court ruled that de-
famatory statements directed at public officials were fully protected
speech under the First Amendment unless the public official could show
85. Under some definitions, structural regulation also occurs when the government
reserves segments of the broadcast spectrum for particular types of communications serv-
ices, or when the government insists that a communications service set aside a portion of
its capacity for certain uses, as when the FCC required cable operators to reserve a
number of channels for "leased access." See Daniel L. Brenner & Monroe E. Price,
Cable Television and Other Nonbroadcast Video § 6.01[1] (1992).
86. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689,
701 (1979):
A common-carrier service in the communications context is one that "makes a
public offering to provide [communications facilities] whereby all members of
the public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or transmit
intelligence of their own design and choosing.... A common carrier does not
"make individualized decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms
to deal."
(citations omitted).
87. See Michael 0. Wirth & Linda Cobb-Reiley, A First Amendment Critique of the
1984 Cable Act, reprinted in 1988 Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts Handbook 315,
323 (John David Viera & Robert Thorne eds., 1988) ("A communications common car-
rier is defined as an entity that provides communication services for hire to the public on
an indifferent basis and customers retain control over communications content.").
88. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974). But see
Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002-04 (2d Cir.) (rejecting claim that the
First Amendment protected newspaper from suit under the Fair Housing Act alleging
bias in classified real estate advertisements), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 81 (1991).
89. Defamatory statements made in a television or radio broadcast can be categorized
as slander rather than libel, since they may considered to be spoken rather than written.
The term "libel," as used in this Note, refers to both libel and slander.
90. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a thorough analysis of Sullivan, see Anthony Lewis,
Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment (1991).
91. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964).
92. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1952).
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that the statements were made with actual malice.93 In the Court's view,
the actual malice standard provides the media with the breathing room
required to pursue the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on
public issues that is such a central goal of the First Amendment.94
In the years since Sullivan, the definition of who qualifies as a public
figure under the actual malice standard has been refined,95 but the basic
rule requiring that public figures prove actual malice still stands. 96 In
addition, in libel suits involving media defendants, courts now require
that the plaintiff prove that the statements in question were false.97 This
new standard, which reversed the prior rule requiring defendants to
prove that the statements were substantially true, provides the media
with a still greater measure of breathing space in libel suits.
Moreover, in establishing guidelines for determining libel liability, the
courts have drawn some distinctions among the various types of media
and communications services. For example, some courts have suggested
that broadcasters should benefit from some additional room for error
when conducting live interviews or covering breaking news stories.98
And in Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,99 a case discussed in much more
detail below,"°° a federal district court determined that because an opera-
tor of an electronic information service functioned essentially as a com-
mon carrier or distributor, it should not be held to the same standard of
libel liability as a publisher or broadcaster. 0 1
III. HISTORICAL ANALOGIES
The preceding Sections examined several rationales for, and First
Amendment restrictions on, government regulation of the electronic me-
dia. This Section considers how the tension between these rationales and
restrictions has shaped the development of three relatively mature elec-
tronic media: the telephone, radio and television broadcasting, and cable
television.'0" This historical review sets the stage for the analysis of elec-
93. The Court said that the "actual malice" standard was satisfied when the plaintiff
proved that the statement in question was made "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
94. Id at 270.
95. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Waldbaum
v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898
(1980).
96. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (concluding
that Falwell was a public figure and that, as a result, the actual malice standard applied).
97. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
98. See Jones v. Taibbi, 508 F. Supp. 1069, 1074 n.12 (D. Mass.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1085 (1981); Pacella v. Milford Radio Corp., 462 N.E.2d 355 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984),
aff'd, 394 Mass. 1051, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985).
99. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
100. See infra notes 324-43 and accompanying text.
101. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140-41.
102. Given the purpose of this Note, this historical review focuses on the First Amend-
ment status of these three technologies. The discussion pays only passing attention to the
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tronic information systems that follows.
A. The Telephone
The telephone was one of the first electronic communications media,
and few would dispute that it has also proven to be one of the most
important and pervasive communications technologies.10 3 Until quite re-
cently, however, legal scholars and the telephone industry itself had ex-
pressed surprisingly little concern about where the telephone fits under
the First Amendment. One reason for this apparent lack of concern may
relate to the historical fact that, like most new technologies, the tele-
phone was initially regulated by analogy."° That is, Congress, the fed-
eral courts, and the states treated the telephone like the existing
technology that it most closely resembled. In the case of the telephone,
that analogous technology was the telegraph, a technology that itself had
never received much respect as a medium worthy of First Amendment
consideration.
According to Ithiel de Sola Pool, late professor of political science at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the telegraph failed to raise
much First Amendment concern because the courts considered it analo-
gous to still another 19th century technological phenomenon: the rail-
roads alongside which the first telegraph wires were strung.10 5 As
Professor Pool has pointed out, the initial model for regulating telegra-
phy "came from the evolving concept of a railroad common carrier."'' 0 6
One critical consequence of adopting this model has been that:
the First Amendment is almost undetectable in cases concerning teleg-
raphy. It might seem odd that when a new technology of communica-
tion came into existence, the courts did not perceive it as an extension
of the printed word, sharing the same significance, the same infirmities,
and the same need for protection as the press whose liberties the courts
many important economic, political, and purely technical factors that have influenced the
development of the technologies independent of First Amendment concerns. Notice,
also, that the discussion avoids analyzing the validity of the various regulatory schemes
and doctrines addressed. The purpose of this historical review is not to judge the effec-
tiveness or desirability of past regulatory practices, but rather to point out what these
practices and policies have been and, ultimately, to suggest how they might surface again
to shape the regulation of electronic information services.
103. In 1988, for example, 92.9% of U.S. households were connected for telephone
service, and Americans made an average total of 1.7 billion personal and business phone
calls daily. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1991,
at tbls. 919, 923 (1990).
104. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488,
496 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("In assessing First Amendment claims concern-
ing cable access, the Court must determine whether the characteristics of cable television
make it sufficiently analogous to another medium to warrant application of an already
existing standard or whether those characteristics require a new analysis."); Ithiel de Sola
Pool, Technologies of Freedom 100 (1983) ("Courts like to treat new phenomena by
analogy to old ones.").
105. See Pool, supra note 104, at 91.
106. Id.
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had so sedulously guarded. The reason for this dim perception of te-
legraphy was that the early telegraph carried so few words at such a
high cost that people thought of it not as a medium of expression but
rather as a business machine.10
7
Another key consequence of this initial perception was that the courts
tended to view the telegraph as a means of commerce that Congress was
free to regulate under the Commerce Clause, rather than as a medium of
communication that was protected against intrusive government regula-
tion under the First Amendment. This perception continues to carry im-
portant implications for federal regulation of the telephone and radio and
television broadcasting, all of which continue to be regulated by Con-
gress under the legislative authority conferred by the Commerce Clause.
1. Telegraph and Telephone Systems as Common Carriers
As Professor Pool observed, the adoption of the railroad model also
resulted in the application of the common carrier form of structural regu-
lation to the telegraph and, by subsequent analogy, to the telephone.1"8
Generally, communications common carriers are required to operate as
"wires for hire," opening their transmission channels to public customers
on a first come, first served basis." 9
This structural designation carries several significant consequences for
the First Amendment status of telegraph systems, telephone companies,
and other communications common carriers. First, because common
carriers must provide open access to their transmission channels, they
are usually prohibited from programming those channels themselves
(that is, from exercising their First Amendment right to free expression
on their own channels) when doing so would result in reduced access for
public users or an unfair competitive advantage for the carrier. Second,
because common carriers are prohibited from exercising editorial control
over the messages transmitted through their facilities, the carriers them-
selves are generally not held liable when those messages include libelous
statements, obscene expression, fraudulent advertising or some other
form of content that is subject to legal sanction.'10 In other words, be-
cause telephone companies and others that operate as common carriers
107. I&
108. See id at 101.
109. See. eg., Wirth & Cobb-Reiley, supra note 87, at 323 ("A communications com-
mon carrier is defined as an entity that provides communication services for hire to the
public on an indifferent basis and customers retain control over communications con-
tent."); see also Federal Communications Comm'n v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S.
689, 701 (1979) ("A common-carrier service in the communications context is one that
'makes a public offering to provide [communications facilities] whereby all members of
the public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or transmit intelli-
gence of their own design and choosing .... "') (citations omitted).
110. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
492 U.S. 115 (1989) (holding the dial-a-porn service provider rather than the telephone




are considered to be primarily transmitters of speech rather than First
Amendment speakers themselves, they do not benefit from the full range
of protections afforded to speakers under the First Amendment. Con-
versely, because they are not held responsible as First Amendment
speakers for the content of the speech that they transmit, communica-
tions common carriers are usually not held liable when that speech is
subject to criminal or civil sanctions. The significance of these distinc-
tions will become more fully evident in the discussion of two communica-
tions technologies that are not regulated as common carriers: radio and
television broadcasting and cable TV.
2. Telephone Systems as Natural Monopolies
Any extended discussion of communications common carriers in the
United States will invariably touch on the theory of "natural monopo-
lies." That is the case because the nation's most dominant and familiar
common carrier, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(AT&T), was allowed to control most local and long distance telephone
service under this concept until the early 1980s."' Briefly stated, the
natural monopoly theory assumes that the public interest is best served
by allowing only one company, or a designated group of companies, to
control a certain service within a given service area."I2 Usually, the ser-
vice is a utility that is considered essential to the public such as electricity
or gas, or one that requires the use of public facilities or rights of way. 1
3
In the United States, the concept of telephone service as a natural mo-
nopoly took some time to evolve. Early in this century, many U.S. cities
were actually served by two or more competing telephone companies."I4
As the telephone gained in importance as a personal and business com-
munications medium, however, it soon became clear that the competition
among local telephone providers was more burdensome than beneficial.
To ensure interconnection with the entire community in areas where
there was competing service, business or home subscribers required two
or more separate phone lines and separate listings in two or more tele-
phone directories, with the exact figures depending on how many compa-
nies competed in the service area.' '5 Those subscribers who were willing
or able to pay for only one phone line naturally gravitated to the larger of
111. The monopoly position of AT&T changed in 1982, however, with the "Bell
breakup" discussed in the text accompanying notes 123-25, infra.
112. See Pool, supra note 104, at 102 (discussing the evolution of the phone system as a
monopoly).
113. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1976) ("[P]ublic
utility regulation typically assumes that the private firm is a natural monopoly and that
public controls are necessary to protect the consumer from exploitation.") (footnote
omitted); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369 (1973) ("Each town
... generally can accommodate only one distribution system, making each town a natural
monopoly market for the distribution and sale of electric power at retail.").
114. See Pool, supra note 104, at 102.
115. See id.
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the competing systems, since it was more likely that more of their
friends, relatives, or business customers also subscribed to that system.
In most communities, the predictable outcome of this process was that
the smaller telephone company or companies lost subscribers and eventu-
ally left the business, leaving the larger telephone company as sole pro-
vider of local telephone service.1 6 In most cities of any size, that sole
provider was or became one of the regional companies owned by AT&T,
the company that also provided the most long distance connections.
Another key result of this process was that the companies that pro-
vided local telephone service became subject to regulation by state public
utility commissions, which stepped in to prevent the unfair pricing prac-
tices and other abuses that can arise under any monopoly, natural or
otherwise."' Over time, the relationship between the telephone compa-
nies and the public utility commissions in most states achieved a sort of
uneasy equilibrium. On the one hand, the commissions preserved the
telephone company's monopoly position, and the more efficient operation
that was presumed to flow from that position, by requiring that any po-
tential competitor obtain a license from the state, and by denying most
requests for licenses on the grounds that the public interest would not be
served by a a second, competitive telephone service.'" On the other
hand, the public utility commissions extracted a price for this protected
position by subjecting the telephone companies to rate regulation and
minimum service requirements.
In theory, a competitive telephone company that has been denied a
license by a state public utility commission can challenge the govern-
ment's action on First Amendment grounds, claiming that the license
denial amounts to unlawful prior restraint of the company's right to free
speech. This kind of constitutional challenge would almost certainly
work if the communications company in question was a newspaper or
book publisher, because licensing and most other forms of prior restraint
of print publishers are forbidden under the First Amendment." 9 How-
ever, the free speech argument carries much less weight when the com-
munications entity is a common carrier because, as discussed earlier,
common carriers are not generally considered "speakers" for First
Amendment purposes. 2 This issue will come up again in the discussion
of radio and television, since several broadcasters have in fact pursued
116. See id
117. One example of this policing at work, at least at the federal level, was the Justice
Department's long-standing antitrust suit against AT&T discussed in the section that
follows.
118. See Pool, supra note 104, at 102.
119. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931).
120. See Pool, supra note 104, at 106 ("[F]irst amendment precedents are largely disre-
garded in common carrier law."); see also United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552
F. Supp. 131, 185 (D.D.C. 1982) (concluding that preventing AT&T from entering the
field of electronic publishing, a form of prior restraint, is not inconsistent with the First
Amendment), aff'd sub nora. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
19931 1165
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
First Amendment challenges to the federal system for licensing television
and radio stations.12 1 It will also come up in the discussion of cable tele-
vision, since the Supreme Court has recently ruled that, unlike telephone
companies, cable television operators do have standing as First Amend-
ment speakers to contest exclusive local licensing agreements. 122
3. Impact of the Bell Breakup
Telephone regulation and the U.S. telephone industry changed radi-
cally in 1982 with the issuance of Judge Greene's decision in United
States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.123 That judgment,
which modified and then entered a consent decree between the parties,
ended the government's longstanding and controversial antitrust litiga-
tion against AT&T. The most immediate and dramatic result of Judge
Greene's decision was the divestiture by AT&T of the seven regional Bell
operating companies that provide most local telephone service in the
United States.124 In return, AT&T and, to a lesser extent, the regional
operating companies, were freed from a number of the broad federal
"line of business" restrictions that had previously limited them to provid-
ing telephone service on a strict common carrier basis. 125
What do these changes mean for the First Amendment status of tele-
121. See infra text accompanying notes 157-68.
122. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494
(1986) (discussed in the text accompanying notes 231-41, infra).
123. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub noma. Maryland v. United States, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983).
124. See id. at 226-27.
125. See id. at 223-24. AT&T benefited most from the removal of the line of business
restrictions because it no longer owned the regional companies that held a monopoly over
local telephone service, and because it no longer monopolized the long distance telephone
market in which it continued to operate. See id. As a result, the consent decree permit-
ted AT&T to enter into all lines of business except for electronic publishing-a business
over which, in the opinion of Judge Greene, there was a substantial risk that AT&T
would gain a monopoly. See id. In contrast, because the regional operating companies
would continue to monopolize local telephone service in their respective operating areas,
the consent decree prevented them from entering, at least initially, any new business ex-
cept for the sale of telephones and related equipment and the marketing of Yellow Pages
advertising directories. See id. at 224. However, subsequent rulings by Judge Greene,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and the FCC have permitted the
regional operating companies to enter several formerly forbidden businesses, including
the provision of certain information services and the transmission of television signals.
See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, "Baby Bell" Fights Cable Law, Citing Right to Free
Speech, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1992, at Dl (reporting on efforts by Bell Atlantic, a re-
gional operating company, to enter the cable television business following recent easing of
line of business restrictions); Edmund L. Andrews, F. C. C. Approves TV on Phone Lines,
N.Y. Times, July 17, 1992, at D5 (discussing impact of FCC decision that allows tele-
phone companies to transmit, but not to produce, television programs); Edmund L. An-
drews, 'Baby Bells,' Newspapers In a Brawl, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1991, at DI, D6
(reporting conflict between telephone regional operating companies and newspapers over
the telephone companies' plans to provide classified advertising and information serv-
ices); see also Mary Lu Carnevale, Ring in the New: Telephone Service Seems on the
Brink of Huge Innovations, Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1993, at 1 (reporting on plans of many
telephone companies to enter markets for video and information services).
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phone companies? In all likelihood, phone companies that enter new ar-
eas of business will seek to secure the same First Amendment status
afforded to their competitors in those businesses. For example, telephone
companies that transmit television signals will probably argue that they
should receive, at a minimum, the same First Amendment treatment as
companies that operate cable television systems. Similarly, phone com-
panies that offer information services to homes may well argue that, in
their role as information providers, they warrant the same First Amend-
ment protection as print publishers. Ultimately, telephone companies
will probably find that they are subject to a number of different constitu-
tional standards, depending on the types of non-telephone services that
they provide and the First Amendment status of the most closely analo-
gous communications services. As discussed infra, this seems to be the
approach that is evolving for another "hybrid" communications system:
cable television.
B. Radio and Television Broadcasting
More so than has been the case for any other communications me-
dium, federal regulation of radio and television broadcasting has been
driven by technical necessity. In fact, much of the government's author-
ity to regulate broadcasters can be traced to a single technical considera-
tion: broadcasters must operate on assigned frequencies or "channels,"
one broadcaster to one channel. Otherwise, chaos prevails, as broadcast-
ers competing for the same channels in the same geographic areas block
each other's transmissions.12
6
Chaos did in fact prevail over radio broadcasting in the 1920s, prior to
the advent of effective federal regulation. At that time, radio transmis-
sion in the U.S. was regulated under the Radio Act of 1912.127 This
legislation, enacted to govern the analogous technology of wireless teleg-
raphy, was intended to bring order to the airwaves by granting the Secre-
tary of Commerce and Labor the authority to license wireless
operators. 128 By the 1920s, however, federal regulatory opinions, an un-
anticipated demand to use radio frequencies for broadcasting voice sig-
nals, and several federal court decisions had left the 1912 Act inadequate
to its intended task.129 In one key case decided in 1923, Hoover v. Inter-
city Radio Co.,30 a federal judge ruled that then Secretary of Commerce
126. See. e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943)
("the radio spectrum simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody"); Quincy
Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1434, 1449 (1985) (citing
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 376
(1969)) ("Without the imposition of some governmental control 'the cacophony of com-
peting voices' would drown each other out.").
127. 37 Stat. 302 (1912).
128. See id. at 302-03.
129. For a review of this early regulatory history, see National Broadcasting Co., 319
U.S. at 212-14.
130. 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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and Labor Herbert Hoover had overstepped his authority in refusing to
renew the license of a wireless telegrapher because renewal would result
in interference to channels that had been assigned to other government
and private users. 131 Three years later, the federal government's powers
to regulate radio received another blow in United States v. Zenith Radio
Corp. ,132 a case in which a federal appeals court ruled that Zenith could
operate a radio station on a frequency and at a time other than those
assigned through the licensing process. 133 Overall, the effect of Intercity
and Zenith was to restrict severely the federal government's power to
police radio traffic, particularly the power to assign specific frequencies
to licensees and to limit licensees to transmitting only on those
frequencies.
Unsure where these and other challenges to the 1912 Act had left the
government's power to regulate radio, the Secretary of Commerce asked
the Office of the Attorney General for its opinion. In its response, issued
in July of 1926, the Attorney General's office stated that the Secretary of
Commerce retained the authority to require radio broadcasters to obtain
licenses and to assign broadcasters specific frequencies and hours of oper-
ation as part of the licensing process. 134 In the Attorney General's view,
however, contradictions within the 1912 Act and adverse court rulings
had left the government with little or no authority to penalize broadcast-
ers who strayed from those assigned frequencies and authorized times of
operation, or who broadcast at a power level greater than that necessary
to service their assigned transmission areas.135 In other words, the Office
of Commerce was left with its licensing powers intact, but with no real
power to regulate the operations of broadcasters once they had obtained
the required license. Without this ongoing regulatory authority, the fed-
eral government was simply unable to control the chaotic free-for-all that
had once again come to characterize radio broadcasting. 3 6
1. The Radio Act of 1927
Once both the executive branch and the judiciary agreed that the 1912
Act gave the government only limited authority to regulate radio, and
once broadcasters had proven incapable of policing themselves, Congress
apparently concluded that more comprehensive legislation was required.
That legislation, the Radio Act of 1927,137 continued the system of fed-
eral licensing administered by the Secretary of Commerce, but added the
policing powers that had been missing from the 1912 Act. 138 The 1927
Act also authorized the creation of the Federal Radio Commission, the
131. See id. at 1006-07.
132. 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926).
133. See id. at 617-18.
134. See 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 126 (1926).
135. See id. at 131-32.
136. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
137. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
138. See id. §§ 1, 4.
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agency charged with providing the ongoing supervision necessary to en-
sure that broadcasters complied with the more stringent operational re-
quirements of the act. 139  Significantly, among the most ardent
supporters of the 1927 Act were commercial radio broadcasters them-
selves, who recognized that the structure and stability provided under
the Act were necessary to the success of their fledgling industry. 4° Even
President Coolidge, no fan of government regulation but a big supporter
of business, had urged Congress to pass the Act.
4 1
The Radio Act of 1927 governed radio communications only until
1934, when it was superseded by the more comprehensive Communica-
tions Act of 1934142 (the "1934 Act"). However, the 1927 Act estab-
lished many of the fundamental premises and policies of broadcast
regulation that were incorporated in the 1934 Act, and that remain effec-
tive today. Those premises and policies include:
The requirement that all broadcasters operate under a federal
license and only on the frequencies assigned to them; 43
The requirement that broadcast licenses be issued for a lim-
ited term 1" (rather than in perpetuity, as had become the case
under the Radio Act of 1912);
The concentration of all regulatory authority in a single fed-
eral agency (the Federal Radio Commission under the Radio
Act of 1927; 14 1 the Federal Communications Commission
under the Communications Act of 1934);"
The requirement that candidates for political office be given
equal access to broadcast facilities 47 (the forerunner of the
Equal Time Provision discussed supra 148) and;
139. See id § 3.
140. See Harold L. Nelson & Dwight L. Tweeter, Jr., Law of Mass Communications
483 (4th ed. 1982).
141. See President Coolidge's Message to Congress, H.R. Doc. 483, 69th Cong., 2d
sess. (1926), reprinted in Documents of American Broadcasting 28 (Frank J. Kahn ed.,
3d ed. 1978).
142. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1-757 (1988)).
143. See Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 1, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). Because broadcasting is
considered a form of interstate commerce (that is, broadcasting in the United States is
primarily a commercial enterprise, and the signals of most broadcasters cross state lines),
regulation of broadcasting is almost exclusively a federal matter. Contrast this with the
regulation of telephone service discussed supra (in which regulatory authority is shared
by the federal government and the states, with federal regulation focusing primarily on
long distance and other interstate services) and with the regulation of cable television
discussed infra (in which regulatory authority is also split, with the federal government
focusing mostly on broad policy matters, and with local government authorities handling
the day-to-day administration of the cable television franchising agreements for their
communities).
144. See Radio Act of 1927 § 1.
145. See id § 3.
146. See 47 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
147. See Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 18, 44 Stat. 1170 (1927).
148. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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The prohibition of government censorship of broadcast con-
tent (coupled, somewhat contradictorily, with a general ban on
obscene, indecent, or profane language). 49
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, section 9 of the 1927 Act
established that broadcast licenses should be granted and renewed sub-
ject to the "public interest, convenience, or necessity." 1 0 As discussed
below, this "public interest and convenience" provision, which Congress
subsequently incorporated in the Communications Act of 1934,151 has
been at the heart of many of the First Amendment challenges to federal
broadcast regulation.
2. The Communications Act of 1934
As the preceding section suggests, the Communications Act of 1934152
is in many respects simply a more comprehensive version of the Radio
Act of 1927. Compared to the 1927 Act, which focused exclusively on
radio broadcasting and wireless telegraphy, the 1934 Act encompasses
those media as well as television (still in the experimental stage in 1934),
telephone, and all other wired and wireless communications systems.
Amended many times over the years, often in response to the emergence
of new technologies, the Communications Act of 1934 has become a sort
of communications constitution that defines the scope and structure of all
federal regulatory authority over electronic communications media.
One key provision of broadcast regulation is found in section 3(h) of
the 1934 Act.153 This provision is often overlooked in discussions of
broadcast regulation because it appears in the portion of the 1934 Act
devoted to definitions, and because this particular provision defines the
term "common carrier." For broadcasters, however, section 3(h) is sig-
nificant not for what it includes but rather for what it excludes. Specifi-
cally, section 3(h) states that "a person engaged in radio broadcasting
shall not ... be deemed a common carrier."15 4 Through this provision,
then, the 1934 Act directs that, rather than being required to serve as
retransmitters of messages produced or provided by third parties, broad-
casters will retain control of and responsibility for the program content
transmitted on their channels. One direct result of this structural
designation is that, unlike common carriers, broadcasters are considered
"speakers" whose programming activities are protected under the First
Amendment. 155
149. See Radio Act of 1927 § 28.
150. Id. § 11.
151. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1988) ("The Commis-
sion, if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby ... shall grant to
any applicant therefor a station license provided for by this chapter.").
152. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1-757 (1988).
153. See id. § 153(h).
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. See, e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468
U.S. 364, 378 (1984) ("[B]roadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form of
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As discussed earlier, however, broadcasters do not enjoy full First
Amendment protection. Instead, under the scarcity and intrusiveness ra-
tionales, courts have concluded that broadcasters' rights as First Amend-
ment speakers must be balanced against the public's First Amendment
interest in obtaining efficient and effective broadcast service.1 '56 Exactly
what this public interest is, and exactly how far the government can go in
restricting broadcasters' First Amendment rights to promote the public
interest, has been the subject of extended controversy.
3. First Amendment Challenges to the Station Licensing Process
In some of the earliest First Amendment challenges to federal broad-
cast regulation, broadcasters attacked the station licensing and renewal
process itself, claiming that the government's use of the public interest
standard to evaluate the programming planned or currently offered by
applicants constituted government censorship, prior restraint, or both.
In Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio Commission,'5 for exam-
ple, the Reverend Doctor Shuler, a religious broadcaster, challenged the
Federal Radio Commission's 58 refusal to renew his license to operate
KGEF, a Los Angeles radio station. 5 9 During the renewal process, sev-
eral residents of the Los Angeles area had complained that Schuler's
broadcasts attacked the Roman Catholic Church. The FRC denied
Shuler's renewal application on public interest grounds, pointing to the
fact that KGEF's programs were "sensational rather than instructive;
and that... Shuler had been convicted of attempting... to obstruct the
orderly administration of public justice.""l6
Shuler appealed the FRC decision, claiming that it violated his rights
of free speech and due process. But the federal appeals court disagreed.
In disposing of the due process question, the court held that the govern-
ment's denial of a broadcast license did not constitute a taking of prop-
erty that raised due process concerns under the Fifth Amendment.'6
With respect to the First Amendment argument, the court concluded
that, although the FRC's actions might constitute a form of government
regulation of speech, this regulation was permissible given the power of
broadcasting and the legitimate public interest goals of the station licens-
ing process:
If it be considered that one in possession of a permit to broadcast in
communicative activity. As a result, the First Amendment must inform and give shape
to the manner in which Congress exercises its regulatory power in this area."); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)
("broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment interest").
156. See supra text accompanying notes 22-50.
157. 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 685 (1932).
158. Although this case was brought under the Radio Act of 1927, the principles that
it raises remain relevant under the Communications Act of 1934.
159. See Trinity Methodist, 62 F.2d at 850-51.
160. Id. at 851.
161. See id. at 853.
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interstate commerce may, without let or hindrance from any source,
use these facilities, reaching out, as they do, from one corner of the
country to the other, to obstruct the administration of justice, offend
the religious susceptibilities of thousands, inspire political distrust and
civic discord, or offend youth and innocence by the free use of words
suggestive of sexual immorality, and be answerable for slander only at
the instance of the one offended, then this great science, instead of a
boon, will become a scourge, and the nation a theater for the display of
individual passions and the collision of personal interests. This is
neither censorship nor previous restraint, nor is it a whittling away of
the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, or an impairment of
their free exercise ..... 16
In other words, in the court's view, the government could properly deny
a broadcast license-in effect, silence a broadcaster for presenting objec-
tionable programming-when doing so seemed necessary to promote the
"public interest, convenience, or necessity."'' 63
- When placed in historical context, the holding in Trinity Methodist is
really quite remarkable. Just one year earlier, in Near v. Minnesota,'64
the Supreme Court had held that any government attempt to prevent the
publication of similarly malicious and defamatory content by a print
publisher constituted impermissible prior restraint. 65 To the Trinity
Methodist court, however, radio broadcasting was a much different me-
dium subject to a much greater degree of government supervision and
regulation. Some ten years later, in National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 66 the Supreme Court showed that it agreed with this view. Faced
with still another First Amendment challenge to the government's right
to deny a broadcast license, the Court concluded that:
Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to
all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other
modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because
it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must be denied....
The standard [that the Communications Act of 1934 provided for the
licensing of stations was the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity.'
Denial of a station license on that ground, if valid under the Act, is not
a denial of free speech.1 67
Although there have been other challenges to the licensing process since
National Broadcasting, the Supreme Court's conclusion that the denial of
a broadcast license on valid public interest grounds is not a denial of
First Amendment rights remains a fundamental precept of media law. ' 68
162. Id. at 852-53.
163. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 11, 44 Stat. 1162, 1167 (1927).
164. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
165. See id. at 722.
166. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
167. Id. at 226-27.
168. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966):
A broadcaster has much in common with a newspaper publisher, but he is not
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4. Other First Amendment Challenges to Broadcast Regulation
Most forms of federal broadcast regulation, including the govern-
ment's right to license broadcasters, rest on the scarcity rationale. As
discussed supra,169 the scarcity rationale posits that the station licensing
process grants to broadcasters the privilege of exploiting a scarce public
resource: the broadcast spectrum. From this grant of privilege has fol-
lowed, in turn, the concept of the broadcaster as a public trustee17 0 sub-
ject to government-imposed obligations and responsibilities that would
constitute clear First Amendment violations if applied to print media.
Some of these requirements and responsibilities are statutory, such as
section 1464 of the U.S. Penal Code,"7' which prohibits the transmission
of obscene and indecent material over broadcast channels, and section
315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934,172 which obligates broadcast-
ers to provide candidates for elective office equal access to the airwaves.
Other content, access, and ownership requirements, including the Fair-
ness Doctrine, are products of the FCC's rulemaking authority. '" With
few exceptions, the courts have concluded that these statutory and regu-
latory restrictions are protected against First Amendment attack so long
as they can be justified as grounded in or extending from the scarcity,
intrusiveness, or public trustee rationales. 174
in the same category in terms of public obligations imposed by law. A broad-
caster seeks and is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable
part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by
enforceable public obligations. A newspaper can be operated at the whim or
caprice of its owners; a broadcast station cannot. After nearly five decades of
operation the broadcast industry does not seem to have grasped the simple fact
that a broadcast license is a public trust subject to termination for breach of
duty.
See also Henry v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 302 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir.) (up-
holding the FCC's authority to impose "reasonable restrictions upon the grant of licenses
to assure programming designed to meet the needs of the local community"), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 821 (1962).
169. See supra text accompanying note 23.
170. See e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 115 (1973) ("broadcast licensees... are regulated as 'proxies' or 'fiduciaries of
the people' "); United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1003 ("broadcast license is a public
trust").
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988).
172. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988). For an explanation of the Equal Time Provision, see
supra note 64.
173. For an overview of these content, access, and ownership requirements, see supra
text accompanying notes 51-83.
174. See e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 453 U.S. 367, 397
(1981) (rejecting television network's First Amendment challenge to § 312(a)(7) of the
Communications Act of 1934, which permits the FCC to revoke a broadcaster's license
for "repeated failure to allow reasonable access to... candidate[s] for Federal elective
office," and concluding that FCC enforcement of this provision "properly balances the
First Amendment rights of federal candidates, the public, and broadcasters"); Federal
Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (rejecting radio sta-
tion's First Amendment challenge to FCC's right to prohibit broadcast of indecent con-
tent); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367
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5. Current First Amendment Status of Broadcasters
As the preceding analysis has emphasized, the scarcity rationale is fun-
damental to the federal system of broadcast licensing and regulation.
More specifically, and more directly relevant to the present discussion,
courts have adopted the scarcity rationale as a key consideration in ac-
ceding to federal content, access, and ownership regulations that would
be rejected as unconstitutional if imposed on print media. In recent
years, however, broadcasters and scholars have questioned the continued
relevancy of the scarcity rationale, arguing that it has lost much of its
validity now that new technologies such as cable television and home
video have given the public an apparent abundance of viewing alterna-
tives. This argument was welcomed at the FCC in the 1980s, when it
formed one of the philosophical cornerstones of the Commission's efforts
to deregulate the communications industry. 75 It has also been given
some credence by the courts, most notably in Telecommunications Re-
search & Action Center v. Federal Communications Commission, 76 a de-
cision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Writing for
the court, Judge Bork seemed sympathetic to the FCC's criticism of the
scarcity rationale as a basis for applying the fairness doctrine to the new
technology of teletext, observing that "[e]mploying the scarcity concept
as an analytic tool, particularly with respect to new and unforeseen tech-
nologies, inevitably leads to strained reasoning and artificial results."' 177
Three years later, the D.C. Circuit expressly adopted the "increased di-
versity of media outlets" reasoning as support for its conclusion that the
FCC's decision to withdraw from enforcing the Fairness Doctrine was
"neither arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion."'178
But Congress has not been so quick to buy into the idea that the scar-
city rationale is no longer relevant to broadcast regulation. In the Fair-
ness in Broadcasting Act of 1987,"'1 a bill intended to codify the Fairness
(1969) (rejecting radio station's First Amendment challenge to FCC's enforcement of the
fairness doctrine). But see Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Vot-
ers, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (holding that § 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967
banning editorializing by public broadcasters violates the First Amendment).
175. See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 207 (1982) (published when Fowler was Chairman of the
FCC).
176. 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
177. Id. at 508. Judge Bork went on to state that "[p]erhaps the Supreme Court will
one day revisit this area of the law and either eliminate the distinction between print and
broadcast media... or announce a constitutional distinction that is more usable than the
[scarcity argument]." Id. at 509. Until that point, however, the D.C. Circuit felt con-
strained by the Supreme Court's endorsement of the scarcity rationale in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), con-
cluding that the fairness doctrine must apply to teletext since "[t]eletext, whatever its
similarities to print media, uses broadcast frequencies, and that, given Red Lion, would
appear to be that." Id.
178. Syracuse Peace Council v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 867 F.2d 654, 669
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
179. S. 742, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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Doctrine in response to the FCC's reluctance to enforce it, Congress as-
serted the following findings:
(1) Despite technological advances, the electromagnetic spectrum re-
mains a scarce and valuable resource;
(2) There are still substantially more people who want to broadcast
than there are frequencies available;
(3) A broadcast license confers the right to use a valuable public re-
source and a broadcaster is therefore required to utilize that resource
as a trustee for the American people;
(5) While new video and audio services have been proposed and in-
troduced, many have not succeeded, and even those that are operating
reach a far smaller audience than broadcast stations; [and]
(6) Even when and where new video and audio services are available,
they do not provide meaningful alternatives to broadcast stations for
the dissemination of news and public affairs. s
Neither these assertions nor the Fairness Doctrine attained statutory sta-
tus, however, because Congress failed to override President Reagan's
veto of the Fairness in Broadcasting Act.
Three years later, Congress launched another, more successful attack
on the FCC's deregulatory policies by passing the Children's Television
Act of 1990.181 This legislation, which became law without President
Bush's signature, reflected Congress's conclusion that the FCC's relaxa-
tion of its broadcast programming and advertising standards during the
1980s had left young viewers underserved, and that newer media such as
cable TV had not adequately filled the void. The Children's Television
Act attempted to correct that condition by directing the FCC to draft
rules requiring that broadcast television stations devote a certain amount
of time to educational and informational programming for children and
to limit the amount of advertising carried during that programming."8 2
Where has all this legislative and judicial jostling left the First Amend-
ment status of broadcasters? While the deregulatory drift at the FCC
and recent court decisions have certainly called the future direction of
broadcast regulation into question, the scarcity rationale and the related
concept of broadcasters as public trustees still form the foundation for
federal regulation of broadcasting under the Communications Act of
1934.183 As long as that remains the case-that is, until Congress or the
courts decree that changes in technology and the number and variety of
media outlets have left broadcasting as just one more competing service
180. Id § 2 (numbering omitted).
181. Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (1990).
182. See id at 996-97.
183. See e'g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468
U.S. 364, 376-77 n.1 1 (1984) (in which the Supreme Court declined to "reconsider [its]
longstanding approach [to political broadcast regulation] without some signal from Con-
gress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that some revi-
sion of the system of broadcast regulation may be required").
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in the communications marketplace-broadcasters will retain their status
as limited First Amendment speakers subject to federal content, access,
and ownership regulations. However, even though broadcasters do not
enjoy full First Amendment protection, they do share one of the burdens
borne by all First Amendment speakers: full responsibility for any
libelous statements made during the programs that they "publish."
C. Cable Television
Originally called "community antenna television" ("CATV"), cable
television developed in the 1950s as a means of bringing broadcast televi-
sion signals to remote areas. 184 Because broadcast signals have a limited
range, and because the signals can be blocked by mountains or other
topographical obstructions, many communities were unserved or under-
served by broadcast television.185 Sensing a business opportunity, entre-
preneurs in these communities staked out positions on the highest
ground available, where they constructed large antennas capable of pull-
ing in distant television signals. Once captured, the signals were trans-
mitted to homes through coaxial cable, a high-capacity wire capable of
carrying multiple television channels. 86
In the early years of its development, cable television attracted little
interest from federal regulators. 1 7 One reason for this lack of interest
was that the two constituencies most directly affected by cable-broad-
casters and the viewing public-had few reasons to complain. Broad-
casters generally welcomed the coming of cable, since the CATV systems
of the early 1950s simply received and retransmitted the signals of the
nearest local television stations (thereby extending the range of these lo-
cal stations and increasing the fees that the stations, with the added cable
audience, could charge to advertisers). 88 For the most part, the mem-
bers of the viewing public were also pleased since, for a fairly modest
monthly fee, they were able to receive multiple television channels where
few or none were available before. 89
The absence of regulatory activity during the CATV industry's early
years also owed a great deal to the fact that, through much of the 1950s,
the FCC was unsure that it had either the authority or the resources to
regulate cable. As the FCC pointed out in a 1952 memorandum to Con-
gress, the Communications Act of 1934 granted the Commission explicit
authority over two groups: broadcasters and common carriers. In the
FCC's opinion, however, the early CATV systems constituted neither
184. For an overview of cable's early regulatory history, see Donald E. Lively, Modern
Communications Law 257-60 (1991).
185. See Don R. Le Duc, Beyond Broadcasting: Patterns in Policy and Law 83 (1987).
In 1956, for example, "nearly half of America's television homes could receive only one
television signal." Id.
186. See id. at 82.
187. See Patrick Parsons, Cable Television and the First Amendment 12-13 (1987).
188. See id. at 12.
189. See id.
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"broadcasting within the meaning... of the [Communications] Act" 9°
nor "interstate common carrier operations within the meaning... of the
Act." 191 Given this lack of express legislative authority, and given the
FCC's limited resources, the Commission declined to assert jurisdiction
over cable.192 This left the regulation of cable, such as it was, to state
and local governments under the auspices of public utility commissions,
sui generis cable television agencies, or local franchising authorities.1 9 3
The FCC's hands-off attitude toward cable began to shift in the late
1950s and early 1960s, however, as the Commission became increasingly
concerned about the impact of CATV systems on local television sta-
tions.194 Not surprisingly, this change coincided with a new develop-
ment in the cable industry: the use of microwave links to import distant
television signals."9 ' Prior to this point, cable operators had been limited
to retransmitting the signals of the broadcast stations operating in closest
geographic proximity to their antenna sites because these were the only
signals that the cable systems' antennas were capable of picking up.
With the use of microwave repeaters, this limitation was lifted, allowing
cable operators to import the signals of television stations broadcasting in
communities hundreds of miles away. 9 6 Significantly, this newfound
ability to import distant TV signals made cable attractive, for the first
time, to individuals living in or near urban areas. Previously, urban resi-
dents had no real reason to pay for cable, since cable operators were
limited to transmitting local stations that most urbanites could already
receive for free. 197
These developments did not go unnoticed by local television broad-
casters, many of whom now feared that, by importing distant TV signals,
cable could become a competitor with, rather than simply a supplement
to, local broadcast service. The local broadcasters voiced their concerns
to the FCC, contending that, contrary to the Commission's previously
stated position, the FCC did in fact have legislative authority to regulate
cable. 198 The broadcasters based this jurisdictional argument on their
assertion that CATY systems should be considered common carriers
under the Communications Act of 1934199 or, alternatively, on their con-
tention that the competition that cable operators now posed to television
station licensees implicated the FCC's statutory mandate to maintain and
190. Goodale, supra note 49, § 1.03 (quoting Senate Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, Review ofAllocation Problems of TVService to Small Communities, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3490 (1958)).
191. IdL
192. See icL
193. For a review of state and local cable regulation, see id. §§ 3.01-3.04.
194. See Parsons, supra note 187, at 13.
195. See Le Due, supra note 185, at 83.
196. See Parsons, supra note 187, at 13.
197. See Le Due, supra note 185, at 83.
198. See Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 251 (1958).
199. See id at 252.
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protect local broadcast service. °°
In 1958, the FCC rejected the suggestion that cable operators should
be considered common carriers. 20 ' However, in a Report and Order is-
sued in 1959, the Commission indicated that it might be more sympa-
thetic to the "impact on broadcasting" argument for extending its
jurisdiction to cable.2"2 At the same time, though, the FCC conceded
that it was unable to determine just what the extent of cable's impact on
broadcasting was, or whether the Commission had congressional author-
ity to take the regulatory action necessary to control that impact. 20 3 Es-
sentially, the FCC's 1959 Report and Order threw the cable regulation
question back to Congress, which then proceeded to fumble through sev-
eral attempts to pass legislation that would have provided a more com-
prehensive regulatory scheme.2 4
With no solution forthcoming from Congress, the FCC eventually ac-
ceded to the continuing pressure from broadcasters and took steps to
restrict the importation of distant signals by cable operators. 205 The
Commission took these steps under its legislative authority to regulate
microwave relays-the "over the air" transmission mechanism used by
cable systems to import TV signals. Needless to say, both cable opera-
tors and the companies that operated microwave relay systems opposed
the FCC's imposition of restrictions, claiming that the new rules unfairly
favored local television broadcasters and unduly burdened the CATV
and microwave carriage industries. A key point in this controversy came
in Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. Federal Communications Com-
mission," a 1963 appeal of the FCC's decision to refuse to allow a mi-
crowave service to transmit TV signals to a Wyoming cable system
unless the cable operator could establish that this importation of distant
signals would not substantially harm a local television station.20 7 Signifi-
cantly, the court went along with the FCC's "economic impact" justifica-
tions for the restrictions, acknowledging the Commission's authority to
regulate cable when necessary to preserve the economic viability of a lo-
cal broadcaster.208
Buoyed by the court's favorable ruling in Carter Mountain, the FCC
embarked on a more ambitious effort to regulate the cable industry. In
1965, for example, the Commission promulgated general rules requiring
microwave-fed CATV systems to carry all local broadcast signals (the
200. See id. at 253.
201. See id. at 253-54.
202. See Federal Communications Commission, Inquiry Into the Impact of Commu-
nity Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV "Satellite" Stations, and TV "Repeaters" on
the Orderly Development of Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403, 430-31 (1959).
203. See id.
204. See Goodale, supra note 49, § 1.04.
205. See Parsons, supra note 187, at 14.
206. 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
207. See id. at 361.
208. See id. at 365-66.
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"must carry" rules) and prohibiting these same cable systems from re-
transmitting programs on imported TV channels that duplicated pro-
gramming broadcast by local stations (the "signal duplication" rules)."°9
In 1966, the FCC went a substantial step further, issuing a new Report
and Order that extended the must carry and signal duplication rules to
all cable systems, regardless of whether they used microwave relays to
import signals, and requiring cable systems operating in the 100 largest
television markets to establish in advance that the importation of distant
broadcast signals would be "consistent with the public interest."21 0
These and other FCC actions generated a number of cases that chal-
lenged the Commission's authority to expand cable regulation. The most
important of these challenges, United States v. Southwestern Cable,211 re-
sulted in a significant if somewhat qualified Supreme Court victory for
the FCC. In Southwestern, the Court concluded that the Commission
did have the authority to regulate cable television, but restricted that au-
thority "to that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the
Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting." '212 Using this "reasonably ancillary" standard as a guide,
the Court went on to rule that the regulations challenged in Southwestern
were within the FCC's legislative authority." 3 The "reasonably ancillary
to broadcasting" standard remained the accepted measure for gauging
the FCC's powers to regulate cable TV until 1984, when the Commission
finally secured explicit legislative authority over cable.
1. The Cable Communications Act of 1984
Congress finally resolved the lingering questions concerning the FCC's
authority to regulate cable by passing the Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984214 (the "Cable Act"). Codified as sections 521 to 559 of the
Communications Act of 1934, the Cable Act delineates specific federal
and state roles in regulating cable television systems. Specifically, the
Cable Act gives the FCC the power to set technical standards for cable
systems2 15 and to establish and enforce cross-ownership restrictions, 21 6 as
well as general authority to regulate franchise fees2 7 and the cable
franchising process.21 8 However, state and local governments remain the
209. See Federal Communications Commission, First Report and Order in Docket
Nos. 14895 and 15233, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965).
210. Federal Communications Commission, Second Report and Order in Docket Nos.
14895, 15233, and 15971, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 782 (1966), aff'd in Black Hills Video Corp. v.
Federal Communications Comm'n, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968).
211. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
212. Id at 178.
213. See id at 178-81.
214. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780 (1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559
(1988)).
215. See 47 U.S.C. § 544 (1988).
216. See id § 533.
217. See id § 542.
218. See id § 541.
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primary authorities empowered to grant cable operators permission to
build cable systems within particular communities. Typically, a local
government grants that permission in the form of a franchise agreement
that stipulates, among other requirements, a percentage of revenues that
the cable company will pay as a franchise fee219 and the range of govern-
ment and public access facilities that the cable company will provide to
the community.
In 1992, responding to consumer complaints about unreasonable in-
creases in cable TV prices, Congress passed the Cable Television Con-
sumer Protection and Competition Act.220 Enacted over the strong
objections of cable TV industry groups, this legislation effectively re-
versed the provision of the 1984 Act that preempted the authority of
local governments to regulate cable costs, returning to local governments
the primary authority to set prices for certain basic cable services. 221 The
1992 legislation also included a number of other provisions that did not
sit well with cable operators, including the requirement that cable sys-
tems carry the signals of most local and nearby broadcasters.222
2. Cable as Common Carrier?
Along with formalizing federal regulatory authority over the cable in-
dustry, the Cable Television Act of 1984 resolved another, more specific
question: Is cable to be considered a common carrier? The answer ap-
pears in section 541(c) of the 1984 Act, which provides that a "cable
system shall not be subject to regulation as a common carrier or utility by
reason of providing any cable service. ' 223 But while this provision ex-
pressly states that cable is not to be treated as a common carrier, the
Cable Act fails to provide an alternative structural designation. In other
words, the Act tells us what cable is not, but it does not tell us what cable
is.
Presumably, because cable is not a common carrier, cable operators do
have some standing as First Amendment speakers. But should cable op-
219. The Cable Act limits this annual franchise fee to five percent of the gross revenues
of the cable system. See id. § 542(b).
220. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
221. See id. § 3 (to be codified as amended 47 U.S.C. § 543). Local governments have
this authority subject to review of their rate regulations by the FCC. See id.
222. See id. § 4 (to be codified as amended 47 U.S.C. § 533); see also Clifford Krauss,
Cable Bill Agreement is Reached: Negotiators Support Fee for Broadcasters, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 10, 1992, at Dl, D2 (describing Congressional accord on broadcast signal carriage
rules to be included in 1992 cable bill).
223. 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (1988) (emphasis added). Note, however, that § 532 of the
1984 Act does require cable operators to set aside a certain portion of their channel ca-
pacity for commercial use. See id. § 532(b)(1). Further, the 1984 Act stipulates that
cable operators must, for the most part, function as common carriers toward these chan-
nels, making them available to third parties on fair terms and refraining from exercising
editorial control over the programming transmitted by third parties. See id. § 532(c). At
the same time, though, § 532 provides safeguards to insure that, to the extent that these
provisions designate cable operators as common carriers, this will be the only context in
which cable operators will be considered common carriers. See id. § 532(b)(3).
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erators receive the full First Amendment rights afforded to print publish-
ers, or the more limited First Amendment standing granted to
broadcasters? As discussed below, this issue has been raised, but never
fully resolved, in several cases involving First Amendment challenges to
cable regulation.
3. Cable System Operators as First Amendment Speakers
The First Amendment did not emerge as a significant factor in litiga-
tion challenging cable regulations until the 1970s. Not coincidentally,
this was also the period during which the FCC enacted a series of rules
that placed an increasing number of public service obligations on cable
operators.224 The cable industry responded by challenging the obliga-
tions on First Amendment grounds, claiming that the requirements re-
stricted the rights of cable operators to exercise complete editorial
control over their channels.
One such challenge came in Federal Communications Commission v.
Midwest Video Corp.,225 a 1979 Supreme Court case in which a cable
operator questioned the FCC's right to require cable systems of a certain
size to provide "channels for access by third parties, and to furnish
equipment and facilities for access purposes." 226 In the initial appeal, the
Eighth Circuit had set aside the access requirements as being both be-
yond the regulatory authority of the FCC and as "present[ing] grave
First Amendment problems. 227
The Supreme Court affrmed but, in doing so, chose to focus almost
exclusively on the jurisdictional question, dealing with the First Amend-
ment issue only in passing. As the Eighth Circuit had pointed out, and
as the FCC itself had acknowledged, the regulations at issue required
cable operators to operate" 'as common carriers on some channels.' "211
Finding no provision in the Communications Act of 1934 that expressly
permitted the FCC to apply this structural designation to cable TV sys-
tems, and noting the express provisions of the 1934 Act that prohibited
the FCC from regulating broadcasters as common carriers, the Supreme
Court concluded that the Commission had exceeded its legislative au-
thority by promulgating the access rules.12 9 Notably, by focusing on
224. These rules are summarized in Federal Communications Comm'n v. Midwest
Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 691-95 (1979).
225. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
226. Id. at 691 (citation omitted). As this language suggests, the FCC rules at issue
were really a form of access regulation intended to transform a portion of the cable sys-
tem's channel capacity into a public forum, thereby promoting "the achievement of long-
standing communications regulatory objectives by increasing outlets for local self-expres-
sion and augmenting the public's choice of programs." Id at 694-95 (citations omitted).
227. Id at 695-96.
228. Id at 702 (citations omitted).
229. See id at 708. As discussed in the text accompanying note 223, supra, the Cable




these jurisdictional and structural issues, the Court was able to avoid
addressing directly the question of cable's status as a First Amendment
speaker. The Court did observe, however, that "[c]able operators now
share with broadcasters a significant amount of editorial discretion re-
garding what their programming will include" 2a°-an indirect acknowl-
edgement that cable operators may at least lay claim to the limited First
Amendment status held by broadcasters.
The Supreme Court spoke to the First Amendment question more di-
rectly some seven years later in City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commu-
nications, Inc.231 In that case, Preferred Communications claimed that
municipal authorities had violated both antitrust law and the First
Amendment by refusing to allow it to construct a cable system that
would compete with the system already operating in Los Angeles under
an exclusive franchise agreement.232 Because the Supreme Court granted
certiorari only on the First Amendment issue,2 33 and because the city's
denial of a construction permit appeared on its face to be an impermissi-
ble prior restraint, the primary question confronting the Court was
whether a cable operator such as Preferred Communications had stand-
ing to sue as a First Amendment speaker.234
The Supreme Court's answer was a unanimous, albeit qualified, "yes."
On the one hand, the Court acknowledged that the activities in which a
cable operator "engage[s] plainly implicate First Amendment inter-
ests"' 235 in that "through original programming or by exercising editorial
discretion over which stations or programs to include in its reper-
toire,",236 a cable company "partakes of some of the aspects of speech and
the communication of ideas as do the traditional enterprises of newspa-
per and book publishers, public speakers, and pamphleteers. '237 On the
other hand, the Court went on to say that a cable operator's "activities
would seem to implicate First Amendment interests as do the activities of
wireless broadcasters" 23 -- a comparison that suggests a willingness by
the Court to balance the First Amendment rights of cable operators
against the government's right to protect the public interest (despite the
fact that, unlike broadcast stations that transmit signals over the public
airwaves, cable systems are not subject to the scarcity rationale). Fur-
ther, the Court concluded that even though cable operators such as Pre-
ferred Communications engage in protected speech, their activities could
be construed as "speech and conduct ...joined' 239 (that is, "speech
230. Id. at 707.
231. 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
232. See id. at 490-91.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 494-96.




239. Id. at 495.
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conduct"), in which case "First Amendment values must be balanced
against competing societal interests." 2' Given these considerations, the
Supreme Court remanded the matter to the district court to determine
whether in fact Preferred's planned activities constituted speech conduct
and, if so, whether the governmental interests advanced by denying Pre-
ferred permission to construct a competing cable system outweighed the
First Amendment concerns. 241
4. The "Must Carry" Controversy
Historically, the FCC's "must carry" rules have required cable compa-
nies to pick up and retransmit to subscribers the signals of all television
stations broadcasting within each cable system's transmission area.242 In
Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,243 a
cable operator challenged the must carry rules on constitutional grounds,
claiming that the rules violated its First Amendment right to control the
content carried on its channels. 2'
The Quincy court began by rejecting the FCC's argument that the
scarcity rationale that applies to broadcasters (and the less stringent stan-
dard of constitutional review that the scarcity rationale implies) should
also apply to cable TV.245 Observing that the conditions of spectrum
scarcity and physical interference among competing users that gave rise
to the rationale in broadcast regulation were not relevant to cable, the
court concluded that "the 'scarcity rationale' has no place in evaluating
government regulation of cable television. ' '2
After rejecting the application of the scarcity rationale, and upon find-
ing no "other attributes of cable television that would justify a... more
forgiving First Amendment analysis, '247 the court concluded that the
FCC had failed to meet its burden of proving that the must carry rules,
as then written, were "narrowly tailored to serve a substantial [govern-
ment] interest.""24 The court fell short of categorically condemning the
must carry regulations, however, noting that it would reconsider the con-
240. Id
241. See id at 495-96. In a subsequent case, Leathers v. Medlock, the Supreme Court
once again acknowledged that cable television is "engaged in 'speech' under the First
Amendment, and is, in much of its operation, part of the 'press'." 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1442
(1991). Here again, however, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether cable
operators should share in the full First Amendment protection enjoyed by print publish-
ers or the more limited protection available to broadcasters.
242. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1434,
1437 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
243. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
244. See id at 1437.
245. See id. at 1448-50.
246. Id at 1449.
247. Id Specifically, the court rejected the argument that neither a cable system's use
of public utility poles nor its arguable status as a natural monopoly justified a lower
standard of constitutional review. See id. at 1449-50.
248. Id at 1463. Note that, after spending considerable time discussing why strict
scrutiny might apply to the must carry rules, the court determined that a strict scrutiny
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stitutionality question "[s]hould the Commission wish to recraft the rules
in a manner more sensitive to ... First Amendment concerns. '249
This reconsideration came two years later in Century Communications
Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission,250 a case in which the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the
FCC's "new, scaled-back" 251 version of the must carry rules. Once
again, the court debated which standard of constitutional review should
apply to regulations affecting the editorial discretion of cable operators:
the strict scrutiny test that applies to government action affecting the
editorial autonomy of print publishers, or the more lenient O'Brien test
used when the regulation in question only incidentally burdens speech.
Once again, however, the court was able to avoid resolving this issue by
concluding that FCC's revised "edition [of the must carry rules] fails to
satisfy even the less-demanding first amendment test of United States v.
O'Brien."252
A key consideration here, as in Quincy Cable, was the court's determi-
nation that the FCC had failed to produce credible evidence establishing
that the must carry rules, in any of their incarnations, did in fact pro-
mote a substantial government interest.253 Even so, the court was careful
to point out here, as it had in Quincy, that it did not find the must carry
rules unconstitutional per se, but rather that the FCC must do a better
job of producing "empirical support or at least sound reasoning ' 254 to
defend the rules under the O'Brien standard. Presumably, had the FCC
met that burden, the court would have been forced to determine if the
relatively forgiving O'Brien test was in fact the correct constitutional
measure to apply to cable television regulation.255
analysis was unnecessary because the rules failed even the more forgiving O'Brien speech-
conduct standard. See id. at 1449-54.
249. Id. at 1463.
250. 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
251. Id. at 298.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 300.
254. Id. at 304.
255. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia may soon be
required to readdress this issue. In 1990, the FCC recommended that Congress take
action to codify the must carry requirements in the interest of protecting local broadcast-
ers. See Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Competition, Rate De-
regulation and the Commission's Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable Television
Service, 5 F.C.C.R. 4962 (1990). In 1992, Congress did just that, including a revised
version of the must carry rules in the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Compe-
tition Act of 1992. See Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 4, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471-77 (1992) (to be
codified as amended 47 U.S.C. § 533). A group of cable operators promptly filed suit in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that this and other provisions of the 1992 Cable Act violate the First Amendment.
See Time Warner Entertainment Co. v United States, No. 92-2494, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19492, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 1992) (denying plaintiff's motion for preliminary
relief).
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5. The Indecent Content Cases
Anyone who has watched premium cable channels such as Home Box
Office ("HBO"), particularly late at night, should not be surprised that a
number of cable operators and cable programming services have come
under attack for disseminating sexually explicit and otherwise "indecent"
content. Often, these attacks have come in the form of prosecution under
local ordinances or state laws that were enacted during the cable
franchising boom of the 1980s, and that were specifically intended to pro-
hibit the transmission of indecent programming by cable television fran-
chisees. Not surprisingly, the cable systems and programming services
prosecuted under these provisions have tended to launch First Amend-
ment counterattacks, claiming that the law or ordinance in question con-
stitutes unconstitutional government censorship.
This scenario was played out in Cruz v. Ferre,256 a case in which a
Miami cable operator sought a judgment declaring that a city ordinance
prohibiting the transmission of obscene or indecent material on cable tel-
evision was unconstitutional.257 Significantly, as in Sable Communica-
tions,25s the challenge was not to the ban on obscene material--content
that falls outside First Amendment protection-but rather to the provi-
sion prohibiting programming that was merely indecent. 9 The district
court judge concluded that this portion of the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional and granted the cable operator's request for declaratory relief.2W°
In appealing the district court's ruling, the City of Miami relied pri-
marily on its position that the ban on indecent content was constitutional
under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Pacifica.26 1 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit disagreed, however, distinguishing Pacifica by drawing distinctions
between the broadcast transmission at issue in that case and the "cable-
cast" in question here.262 As the court pointed out, Pacifica "focused
upon broadcasting's 'pervasive presence,' and the fact that broadcasting
is 'uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read.' "263 In
contrast, cable is not nearly so pervasive or intrusive, since subscribers
"must affirmatively elect to have cable service come into [their]
256. 755 F.2d 1415 (1lth Cir. 1985).
257. See id at 1416-17.
258. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 492
U.S. 115 (1989). See the discussion of Sable, supra, in notes 35-43 and accompanying
text.
259. See Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1418. The circuit court suggested that the section of the
ordinance banning obscene material was constitutional, pointing out that the definition of
"obscene" used in the ordinance closely followed the standards set out by the Supreme
Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973). See Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1418.
260. See Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1416-17.
261. See id at 1418 (citing Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978)). See the discussion of Pacifica, supra, in notes 25-34 and accompanying
text.
262. See Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1419-22.
263. Id at 1420 (citation omitted) (quoting Pacifica).
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home[s]," 26 and since subscribers "must make the additional affirmative
decision whether to purchase any 'extra' programming services, such as
HBO., 2 65 For these reasons, and because most cable operators provide
subscribers with "lockboxes" that parents can use to prohibit access to
selected channels, the court also concluded that objectionable cable pro-
gramming is not nearly as accessible to children as the broadcast trans-
mission at issue in Pacifica.2 " Given these distinctions, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded, as had the district court, that the Miami indecency
ordinance fell outside the limited First Amendment exception that had
shielded the FCC's regulatory action in Pacifica.267
Just a few weeks after Cruz, a federal district court followed a similar
line of reasoning in declaring Utah's Cable Television Programming De-
cency Act268 unconstitutional. Like the court of appeals in Cruz, the
court in Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson 269 concluded
that the Pacifica "intrusiveness" rationale did not apply to cable televi-
sion because cable is "not an uninvited intruder" into the home.y The
district court also considered whether a state's power to regulate inde-
cent cable content may be preempted under section 636(c) of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (which prevents states generally
from regulating program content carried on cable systems) 271 or, con-
versely, protected under section 638 of the 1984 Act (which reserves for
state and local governments the right to regulate obscene content,
libelous statements, and certain other types of expression that fall outside
the First Amendment).272 Dealing with the section 638 exemption first,
the district court determined that this section of the statute did not apply
here, since the Utah statute banned both obscene and indecent expres-
sion.273 The district court never expressed an opinion as to whether the
statute would in any event have been preempted by section 636(c), pre-
sumably because its subsequent conclusion that the law was unconstitu-
tional made this further foray into statutory interpretation unnecessary.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 1419-22.
267. See id. at 1421-22. The Eleventh Circuit also held that "[elven if we were to find
the rationale of Pacifica applicable to this case, we would still be compelled to strike the
ordinance as facially overbroad." Id. at 1421.
268. 1983 Utah Laws ch. 207, §§ 1-8 (codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1701 to -
1708 (Supp. 1984)) (repealed 1988).
269. 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd,
480 U.S. 926 (1987).
270. Id. at 1113. But see the long concurrence to the Tenth Circuit's brief opinion
affirming Community Television in which Judge Balcock argued that Pacifica should ap-
ply to cable because cable television transmissions are both pervasive and uniquely acces-
sible to children. See Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 1006-07 (10th Cir. 1986)
(Balcock, J., concurring).
271. See Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1102.
272. See id. at 1103-04.
273. See id. at 1104-05.
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6. Current First Amendment Status of Cable Operators
In some respects, the status of cable under the First Amendment is
fairly well settled. For example, the Cable Communications Act of 1984
mandates that cable is not to be considered a common carrier for regula-
tory purposes,27 4 and Preferred Communications275 and its progeny tell
us that cable operators are considered speakers for First Amendment
purposes.276 In addition, Quincy Cable TV2 77 and Century Communica-
tions278 make it clear that, unlike broadcast channels, cable systems do
not fall within the extended regulatory reach of the scarcity rationale. 9
Finally, Cruz280 and other indecent content cases281 indicate that cable
television places at the middle-to-low end of the "spectrum of intrusive-
ness"-a placement that justifies a lesser degree of government regula-
tion under the Pacifica rationale.
In many other respects, however, the First Amendment status of cable
remains unclear. First, although Preferred Communications282 does con-
fer speaker status on cable operators,283 the Supreme Court has so far
declined to decide whether government regulations affecting cable should
be subject to the strict scrutiny that is brought to bear when pure expres-
sive speech is at issue, or to the lesser standard that applies in a speech/
conduct or other "indirect effects" context. 2 4 Second, although Midwest
Video285 makes it clear that the FCC has no authority to require cable
operators to provide public access channels and facilities, the Cable Com-
munications Act of 1984 allows local government authorities to include
public access requirements in their franchise agreements with cable oper-
ators.28 6 Third, to complicate matters further, the 1984 Cable Act re-
274. See the discussion of this issue, supra, in note 223 and the accompanying text.
275. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
276. See the discussion of Preferred Communications, supra, in the text accompanying
notes 231-41.
277. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1434
(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
278. Century Communications Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 835 F.2d
292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
279. See the discussion of Quincy and Century, supra, in the text accompanying notes
243-55.
280. Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (1lth Cir. 1985).
281. See the discussion of these cases, supra, in the text accompanying notes 256-73.
282. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
283. See id at 494.
284. See id. at 496-97 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In his concurrence, which Justices
Marshall and O'Connor joined, Justice Blackmun noted that the Court's opinion left
"open the question of the proper standard for judging First Amendment challenges to a
municipality's restriction of access to cable facilities." Id at 496. Justice Blackmun went
on to observe that "the Court must determine whether the characteristics of cable televi-
sion make it sufficiently analogous to another medium to warrant application of an al-
ready existing [First Amendment] standard or whether those characteristics require a
new analysis." Id
285. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
See the discussion of Midwest Video in the text accompanying notes 225-30.
286. See 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988).
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quires cable systems of a certain size to designate a percentage of their
channels for commercial, leased access use-in effect, requiring cable
companies to set aside and operate part of their systems as common car-
riers.287 Finally, the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Compe-
tition Act of 1992 granted local franchising authorities and the FCC the
power to regulate the prices that cable operators charge for basic cable
service2 8 -a development that may give rise to a whole new set of First
Amendment challenges by cable operators.
This regulatory and constitutional confusion stems, at least in part,
from the fact that cable is a hybrid medium that combines elements of
broadcasting and common carriage. Like broadcasters, for example,
many cable operators produce and transmit their own "local origination"
programming. In addition, like common carriers, all cable operators re-
transmit program content created and provided by others. Unlike com-
mon carriers, however, cable companies retain control over which
programs and channels they will retransmit, with the exception of the
channels that they are required to provide for commercial and public
access users. And unlike broadcasters, cable operators are free from
most of the content regulations that are applied to television and radio
stations under the spectrum scarcity and Pacifica rationales.
Similar to broadcasters, though, cable operators that originate their
own programming are subject to the equal time provision.289 Further,
like broadcasters but unlike print publishers, cable systems are subject to
cross ownership restrictions intended to promote diversity of ownership
in local media outlets.29°
Finally, the hybrid nature of cable also complicates the question of
cable operator liability under state libel laws. Section 558 of the Cable
Communications Act of 1984291 appears to relieve cable companies of
liability for libelous statements transmitted over commercial access chan-
nels that the company is required to provide under section 532(b) of the
Act, and over which section 532(c)(2) prevents the company from exer-
cising editorial control.2 92 Like broadcasters and publishers, however,
cable operators would appear to be fully liable for defamatory statements
made in programs or editorial material that they themselves originate.
Much less certain is the question of liability for libelous statements made
287. See 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1988).
288. See Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 3, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (to be codified as amended 47
U.S.C. § 543).
289. See Goodale, supra note 49, § 2.1012]. Cable systems that originate programming
might also be subject to the Fairness Doctrine, were the FCC still enforcing that doctrine.
See id. § 2.10[1].
290. See 47 U.S.C. § 533 (1988) (prohibiting one company or individual from owning a
cable system and broadcast station in the same television market).
291. 47 U.S.C. § 558 (1988).
292. See id. §§ 532(b), 532(c)(2), 558; see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Public Servs.
Comm'n, 906 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir.) ("In exchange for the loss of editorial control, Con-
gress relieved cable operators of potential criminal and civil liability for the content of
transmissions carried over these [access] channels."), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 388 (1990).
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on "third party" channels that cable operators merely retransmit on their
systems, but that they control to the extent that they decide which of the
many available third-party channels they will carry.293 As discussed in
the section that follows, a similar question has come up in the context of
electronic information services.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT STATUS OF ELECTRONIC
INFORMATION SERVICES
Part I of this Note examined the various rationales that justify govern-
ment regulation of communications media generally and electronic me-
dia specifically. Part II defined the primary categories and forms that
this regulation usually assumes. Part III traced the regulatory history of
the telephone, broadcast, and cable industries, paying particular atten-
tion to how technical and policy considerations have combined to shape
the treatment of these technologies under the First Amendment. This
Section attempts to bring all of these historical lessons and analogies to
bear on the primary issue at hand: the First Amendment status of elec-
tronic information services.2 94
A. Background
Known popularly as "computer bulletin boards," electronic informa-
tion services emerged with the microcomputer revolution of the 1980s. 29"
As microcomputers became common in homes and small businesses,
many microcomputer users began to feel a need to communicate with
other users about their computing needs and interests. The early com-
puter bulletin boards responded to this need by providing an electronic
location where microcomputer users could post queries and receive re-
sponses. To communicate in this manner, computer users needed only a
phone line, the phone number of the bulletin board, a "modem" telecom-
munications device connected to their computer, appropriate telecom-
munications software, and a password or identification number.
As this description suggests, many of the first computer bulletin
boards were small, not-for-profit operations that functioned as online
meeting places for those that shared interests in particular aspects of
microcomputer culture. However, the 1980s also saw the emergence of
293. The general rule is that "'one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory
matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it.'" Cianci v. New York
Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d. Cir. 1980) (quoting the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 578 (1977)).
294. This discussion focuses on the First Amendment status of EIS operators. For
analyses of other aspects of EIS operator liability and responsibility, including questions
of criminal liability for user misuse of electronic information services, see Edward M. Di
Cato, Operator Liability Associated with Maintaining a Computer Bulletin Board, 4
Software L.J. 147 (1990) and Jonathan Gilbert, Note, Computer Bulletin Board Operator
Liability for User Misuse, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 439 (1985).
295. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights
in an Age of Electronics and Information 110 (1986).
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larger, commercial electronic information services such as Compuserve
and Prodigy.296 Along with serving as electronic post offices for the ex-
change of electronic messages, these commercial systems provide various
"value added" services such as stock market quotations, sports scores,
electronic encyclopedias, computer games, national and regional news,
online shopping, and instant airline reservations. As addressed further in
the discussion of Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc. ,297 infra,298 some com-
mercial information systems also sponsor or sublet electronic space to
"special interest" groups or "forums" that provide services tailored to
subscribers with interests in certain areas.29 9
B. Coming Up With the Correct Analogy
As discussed earlier, new communications technologies tend to be reg-
ulated, at least initially, like the existing technology to which they are
most closely analogous.3" In the case of electronic information services,
however, it is not immediately clear what the most closely analogous
communications technology is. On first view, it is tempting to compare
electronic information services to telephone technology, since subscribers
communicate with an EIS over phone lines. Unlike telephone companies
or other common carriers, though, the entities that operate electronic
information services do not own or control transmission channels. In-
stead, EIS operators simply control a service that is carried over phone
lines. Thus, it is not clear that the common carrier provisions of the
Communications Act of 1934, which are primarily intended to regulate
access to transmission channels, could or should apply to electronic in-
formation services.
Analogies to other electronic communications media seem even more
strained. Unlike broadcasters, for example, electronic information serv-
ices do not transmit signals over the public airwaves, and they are not
required to operate under a government license. And unlike cable televi-
sion companies, EIS operators do not require exclusive franchise licenses
to provide service in particular communities, nor is there any apparent
need for the FCC to regulate the operation of electronic information
services as being "reasonably ancillary" to the Commission's obligation
296. According to one source, there were an estimated 45,000 public access electronic
information services operating in 1992, the vast majority of them "mom-and-pop opera-
tions [that] come and go." William Grimes, Computer as a Cultural Tool: Chatter
Mounts on Every Topic, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1992, at C13. The same source lists Prodigy
as the largest commercial EIS with 1.75 million subscribers, followed closely by Com-
puserve with 1.69 million users. Other large commercial EIS operators are GENIE
(350,000 subscribers), America Online (180,000 subscribers), and Delphi (100,000 sub-
scribers). See id.
297. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
298. For further discussion of Cubby, see infra notes 324-43 and accompanying text.
299. Compuserve, for example, provides "access to over 150 special interest 'forums,'
which are comprised of electronic bulletin boards, interactive online conferences, and
topical databases." Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 137.
300. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
1190 [Vol. 61
NEW TECHNOLOGY, OLD PROBLEM
301to regulate broadcasters or common carriers.
Of course, there is another choice: treating EIS operators as print pub-
lishers. In several respects, this analogy would seem to provide the clos-
est fit. After all, electronic information services do seem to function
primarily as electronic publishers, providing subscribers with informa-
tion in text and (in some cases) graphic form. And this analogy would
certainly seem to be attractive to most EIS operators, since status as print
publishers would generally provide them with the greatest protection
under the First Amendment.
But the two leading cases in this area indicate that there may be obsta-
cles to regulating EIS operators as publishers. First, Telecommu-
nications Research & Action Center v. Federal Communications
Commission3 2 (the "TRAC" decision) suggests that the manner in
which electronic information services are transmitted, rather than the
fact that they function as electronic publishers, is the key to determining
their status under the First Amendment. 3 3 Second, in Cubby Inc v.
Compuserve Ina," the operator of one of the world's largest electronic
information services argued that it should not be treated as a publisher-
and the court agreed.305
Both TRAC and Cubby are considered more closely below. First,
however, a more fundamental question requires examination: assuming
that the government has an interest in regulating electronic information
services, which of the rationales raised earlier would serve as the founda-
tion for such regulation? That is, for electronic information services,
what public interest goal would allow the government to get around the
First Amendment roadblocks to regulation?
C. Coming Up With the Correct Regulatory Rationale
As discussed in Part I, supra, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
two primary theories under which the government may regulate commu-
nications content: the Red Lion "scarcity" rationale 0 6 and the Pacifica
"intrusiveness" rationale.30 7 However, while these rationales remain the
primary justifications for regulating broadcasting, neither would appear
to justify government regulation of electronic information services. The
scarcity argument simply seems irrelevant, since electronic information
services do not transmit over the public airwaves-a precondition for the
301. As discussed in the text accompanying note 212, supra, the Supreme Court has
concluded that the FCC has general authority to regulate cable television to the extent
that the cable regulations in question are "reasonably ancillary" to the Commission's
duty to regulate broadcasting.
302. 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
303. See id. at 506-09.
304. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
305. See iL at 139 ("CompuServe argues that, based on the undisputed facts, it was a
distributor... as opposed to a publisher .... ).
306. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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scarcity rationale to apply. Further, there is no allegation or suggestion
that electronic information services operate as natural or de facto mo-
nopolies-a condition that might also support a scarcity argument. But
the scarcity rationale would apply if one assumes, as did the TRAC
court, that an EIS picks up the regulatory characteristics of the medium
over which it is transmitted, and if that medium is itself subject to the
scarcity rationale.
Determining the relevancy of the intrusiveness rationale to EIS regula-
tion requires figuring out where electronic information services fit on the
"spectrum of intrusiveness"3 ' derived from Pacifica 09 and Sable.31°
Those cases, particularly Sable, suggest that electronic information serv-
ices would place at the "least intrusive" end of the spectrum alongside
pay-per-view, dial-a-porn and other services that require an initiating act
or invitation to trigger transmission into the home. In fact, under the
criteria set out in Sable and Cruz, 3 11 electronic information services
would seem to be among the least intrusive of communications media,
since gaining access to an EIS requires the use of a considerable amount
of computer equipment, a "dial up" initiated by the user, and (at least for
commercial services) the entering of an individual password assigned to
each user. With this in mind, the intrusiveness rationale simply does not
work as a way to justify government regulation of EIS operators.
D. Regulating Electronic Information Services: Lessons from the
TRAC and Cubby Cases
As the preceding sections indicate, there is no quick answer to the
question of how far the government can and should go in regulating elec-
tronic information services. The regulatory experiences of existing com-
munications technologies offer no clear guidance, since no existing
technology provides a closely analogous fit with electronic information
services. The theories that have historically justified government regula-
tion of communications media provide no certain solution either, because
none of the recognized rationales are directly relevant to the regulation of
EIS operators. As the two cases discussed below show, this lack of clear
historical guidance has required courts either to stretch and reshape ex-
isting regulatory policies to fit electronic information services, or to come
up with rationales and analogies of their own for determining the extent
to which government can regulate EIS operators under the First
Amendment.
308. For a definition of the spectrum of intrusiveness, see supra notes 45-50 and ac-
companying text.
309. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
310. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 492
U.S. 115 (1989).
311. Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1421 (11 th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of Cruz, see
supra notes 256-67 and accompanying text.
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1. The TRAC Case
In Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. Federal Com-
munications Commission,3" 2 the D.C Circuit considered whether the
Fairness Doctrine should apply to teletext, a type of electronic informa-
tion service that is transmitted within an unused portion of the broadcast
television signal. 313 The FCC had determined that the doctrine should
not apply because, in its opinion, "teletext 'more closely resembles...
print communication media such as newspapers and magazines' ,,314
than broadcast communications. In other words, the FCC concluded
that this new communications technology was more closely analogous to
print media than to broadcasting, an assumption that led the Commis-
sion to the corollary conclusion that teletext operators should receive the
same level of First Amendment protection as print publishers.31 5 More
specifically, because teletext is like print publishing, and because print
publishers are not subject to the scarcity rationale that the Supreme
Court has cited as justification for imposing the Fairness Doctrine on
broadcasters,31 6 the FCC found that it was not justified in applying the
doctrine to teletext operators.3" 7
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the FCC's reasoning, however,
holding that the FCC really had no choice but to apply the Fairness
Doctrine to teletext.318 While it seemed sympathetic to many aspects of
the Commission's argument, the court found dispositive the fact "that
teletext is transmitted over broadcast frequencies that the Supreme Court
has ruled scarce. ' 3 9 That is, the D.C. Circuit focused almost exclusively
on the nature of the technology over which teletext is broadcast, conclud-
ing that "[t]eletext, whatever its similarities to print media, uses broad-
cast frequencies, and that, given Red Lion, would seem to be that., 320
Significantly, although the court acknowledged that "main signal opera-
tors" 32 1 (television station licensees) controlled and operated most
312. 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987). Other aspects of
TRAC are discussed in the text accompanying notes 176-78, supra.
313. See TRAC, 801 F.2d at 503. Like conventional commercial ETS systems that
employ telephone transmission, broadcast teletext provides subscribers with information
and entertainment services in text and graphic form. See id Because it is a broadcast
service, however, teletext cannot accommodate interactive communications such as elec-
tronic mail or "online" dialogues among users (both of which are available on most con-
ventional electronic information services). As the D.C. Circuit was careful to point out,
its analysis in TRAC applies "exclusively to such over-the-air transmissions, and not to
transmission of text and graphics by way of cable or telephone." Id.
314. I at 504.
315. See id
316. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S.
367, 388 (1969).
317. See Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 801 F.2d 501, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
318. See id at 504.
319. Id at 508.
320. Id at 509.
321. Id at 503.
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teletext services at the time, it held that the FCC should apply the fair-
ness doctrine to all broadcast teletext providers based on the nature of
the transmission technology involved, and not just to those providers
otherwise subject to the doctrine through their role as broadcast
licensees.3 22
If adopted widely, the TRAC holding that teletext "picks up" the regu-
latory traits of the medium over which it is transmitted would have
profound implications for the First Amendment status of all electronic
information services. As discussed earlier, most electronic information
services, including large commercial operations such as Prodigy and
Compuserve, operate over phone lines. Applying the reasoning in
TRAC, this would mean that most electronic information services would
pick up the regulatory characteristics of a common carrier. In one sense,
this would be a favorable outcome for EIS operators, since common car-
riers are free from most of the content regulations that burden broadcast-
ers and from general liability under state libel laws. In important other
ways, however, acquiring the structural designation of common carrier
would carry its own burdens and drawbacks, including the loss of edito-
rial control (the result of having to make space available to third parties
on a non-discriminatory basis) and, possibly, the loss of any claim that
EIS operators would otherwise have to full status as First Amendment
speakers.3 23
2. The Cubby Case
Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc. 324 required a federal district court sit-
ting in diversity to determine the structural status of electronic informa-
tion services under state libel law. The defendant, Compuserve, operates
a commercial electronic information service.325 As the court explained
it, Compuserve acts like an online "electronic library. ' 326 In return for a
membership fee and usage charges, subscribers gain access to thousands
of information sources available on the system, some of which are pre-
pared and provided by Compuserve itself, as well as to "over 150 special
interest 'forums' which are comprised of electronic bulletin boards, inter-
active online conferences, and topical databases. ' 327 Most of these fo-
rums are operated by third parties who, under a contract with
Compuserve, "'manage, review, create, delete, edit and otherwise con-
trol [their] contents'. ' 328  One of these forums, Rumorville USA
("Rumorville"), was the focus of this lawsuit.
322. See id. at 508 ("[t]he dispositive fact is that teletext is transmitted over broadcast
frequencies").
323. See the discussion of common carrier status in the text accompanying notes 108-
10, supra.
324. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
325. See id. at 137.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. (citation omitted).
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Rumorville allegedly published defamatory statements about a com-
petitive service, "Skuttlebut," and one of Skuttlebut's principal or-
ganizers.32 9 Cubby, Inc., the corporate parent of Skuttlebut, sued
Compuserve for libel, trade disparagement, and unfair competition under
the theory that Compuserve, as the EIS operator, was liable as the pub-
lisher of Rumorvifle. 33 0 Thus, the threshold question in this case, and
the focus of Compuserve's motion for summary judgment, was whether
an EIS operator could in fact be held liable as a "publisher" for third-
party statements transmitted on its system.3 3 '
Like most courts confronted with questions concerning the regulatory
status of a new technology, the district court in Cubby could not resist
the urge to analogize. But unlike the Court of Appelas in TRA C, which
looked to the transmission technology involved in drawing its regulatory
analogy, the Cubby court took a more functional approach. 32 Concen-
trating on the relationship between Compuserve and the operators of fo-
rums such as Rumorville, the court concluded that, in this relationship,
Compuserve functioned more as a distributor than a publisher of infor-
mation.333 In other words, like a book distributor, "Compuserve may
decline to carry a given publication [such as Rumorville] altogether, [but]
in reality, once it does decide to carry a publication, it will have little or
no control over the publication's content. '334 Further, like a large dis-
tributor of print publications, an EIS operator such as Compuserve has
"'no duty to monitor each issue of every [publication] it distributes.' ,,331
Finding no such duty, and finding no evidence that the defendant either
"knew or had reason to know of Rumorville's contents," the court
granted Compuserve's motion for summary judgment.336
Although the district court's ruling was a clear individual victory for
Compuserve, Cubby carries several potentially conflicting implications
for EIS operators generally. For example, in determining that Com-
puserve functioned as a distributor, the court was essentially saying that,
like common carriers such as phone companies, EIS operators should not
generally be held liable for the third-party content that they transmit.
But the reason that courts do not generally hold common carriers liable
for libelous or otherwise actionable third-party transmissions is that, un-
329. See id at 138.
330. See id
331. See id
332. Of course, in this libel case, one reason for not focusing on the transmission tech-
nology involved may have been the court's realization that this would not have been a
very useful comparison, since most media technologies are subject to the same, or at least
very similar, standards of libel liability. In contrast, the transmission technology consid-
eration was key in TRAC, since the issue in that case was the application of the Fairness
Doctrine to teletext, and since broadcasting stations are the only transmission channels
subject to the Fairness Doctrine.
333. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140.
334. Id.
335. Id (citation omitted).
336. Id at 141.
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like EIS operators, these "wires for hire" do not have discretion to ex-
clude particular third-party information providers from using their
channels.337 The Cubby court conceded that EIS operators do have this
discretion, 338 but found another, more functional consideration that, in
the court's opinion, worked to exempt Compuserve from libel liability.
The court held that, given the speed of electronic communications and
the amount of information involved, there is no practical way for an EIS
operator to monitor the content of the postings on its system.339 Using
this same reasoning, an EIS operator like Prodigy should not be held
liable, in libel or under any other legal theory, for the content of the
electronic mail carried on its system.34
Again, this exemption from libel liability rests on the premise that it is
impossible, or at least very impractical, for an EIS operator to exercise
any real degree of editorial control over third-party postings. But what if
an EIS operator does attempt to exert some level of control over third-
party content, as Prodigy has done in attempting to place constraints on
the use of its electronic mail services?341 Would this take the EIS opera-
tor out of the limited "functional distributor" exception introduced in
Cubby, leaving the operator liable for libelous and other actionable con-
tent? Such a result would be somewhat ironic, since it would effectively
punish those EIS operators who attempt to take an active editorial role
and reward those who simply sit back and assume the role of passive
common carriers.
Cubby also raises another related concern. Usually, relief from liabil-
ity of the sort granted to Compuserve is provided as part of a tradeoff:
the communications entity in question receives the relief in return for
providing access to third parties on a non-discriminatory basis. Conceiv-
ably, then, the district court's decision in Cubby could open the door to
regulations requiring EIS operators to set aside all or part of their capac-
ity for this sort of common-carrier-like access. 34 2 Although just a theo-
retical possibility today, mandated access could become more probable if,
as seems likely, electronic information services become increasingly im-
portant sources of information and if, as also seems likely, the commer-
cial EIS industry comes to be dominated by a few large "information
utilities."
337. See the discussion of common carrier status, supra, notes 108-10 and accompany-
ing text.
338. See Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
339. See id.
340. As the Cubby court acknowledged, however, an EIS operator might be held liable
if the plaintiff could show that the operator in fact "knew or had reason to know" about
the actionable statements sufficiently in advance of their transmission to take preventive
measures. Id. at 141.
341. See Takahashi, supra note 1, at D5.
342. A precedent for such a requirement is the commercial access set-aside for cable
TV systems mandated by § 532 of the Communications Act of 1934. See 47 U.S.C. § 532
(1988). The cable commercial access set-aside is discussed in the text accompanying note
287, supra.
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Finally, on a more general level, just what does Cubby say about the
status of EIS operators as First Amendment speakers? First, even
though the district court did not address this question directly, there can
be little doubt that EIS operators possess speaker status when they them-
selves originate the information services transmitted to subscribers. The
Cubby court seemed to go further, however, suggesting that Compuserve
retained its full rights as a First Amendment speaker even when func-
tioning in its role as a distributor - 3 and that, in that role, it actually
enjoyed a greater measure of protection against libel liability than do
print publishers. Although this sort of expanded speaker status may well
be justified, it would seem to provide EIS operators with a First Amend-
ment windfall, allowing them to gain all of the benefits of publisher status
while escaping much of the burden of libel liability.
E. Analysis and Recommendations
Although Cubby, Inc v. Compuserve Inc 3" certainly does not resolve
the question of where electronic information services fit under the First
Amendment, the district court's decision does point to the sort of analy-
sis that may prove useful in reaching that determination. Again, the dis-
trict court adopted a functional approach, focusing on the types of
services that Compuserve provided and the manner in which it operated
as the keys to evaluating its level of liability under libel law.' 5 In con-
trast, the TRAC 31 court took a more technical "transmission channel"
approach, concluding that teletext must be subject to the Fairness Doc-
trine simply because it is carried on broadcast channels that are them-
selves subject to the doctrine.347 As discussed below, the functional
analysis used in Cubby seems the more flexible and constitutionally via-
ble of the two approaches, especially when it comes to evaluating the
First Amendment status of electronic information services and other new
technologies that combine the characteristics of several different media.
Many new media, and many newer applications of older media, do
combine characteristics that blur the conventional regulatory boundaries
between communications services and technologies. For example, cable
television combines elements of broadcasting, publishing, and common
carriage in a single communications system.348 Similarly, since the
343. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
("First Amendment guarantees have long been recognized as protecting distributors of
publications." [citation omitted]; "Given the relevant First Amendment considerations,
the appropriate standard of liability to be applied to Compuserve [in its role as distribu-
tor] is whether it knew or had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory Rumorville
statements.").
344. Id.
345. See id. at 140.
346. Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
347. See id at 517.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 287-93.
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AT&T breakup, the regional telephone operating companies have sought
and in some cases secured the right to provide video and electronic pub-
lishing services over the local phone lines that they operate as common
carriers.349 Additionally, as just discussed, electronic information serv-
ices such as Compuserve and Prodigy operate as both publishers and dis-
tributors while operating over telephone lines that are regulated as
common carriers.
A strict TRAC approach would focus only on the transmission tech-
nology involved, adopting the First Amendment standard that has tradi-
tionally been applied to that technology or, if it is a new transmission
technology, the standard that has been applied to the most closely analo-
gous existing communications medium. However, as the TRAC court
itself acknowledged, a rote application of the transmission technology
approach to new media "inevitably leads to strained reasoning and artifi-
cial results." 3 0 This strained reasoning was evident in TRAC, where the
court adopted the transmission technology approach in ruling that the
fairness doctrine applied to teletext, but where more than half the court's
opinion was devoted to discussing concerns about the practical "applica-
bility" of the doctrine to teletext.351
The TRAC rationale becomes even more strained when applied to sce-
narios in which a publisher converts, verbatim, an existing print publica-
tion to electronic form and then retransmits the converted publication
over teletext. Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo,3 2 the newspaper publisher could not be required
to accommodate a "right of reply" in the print version of the newspa-
per.353 Under the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in TRAC, however, the pub-
lisher could be required to accommodate a right-of-reply in the electronic
version of the newspaper, since communications on broadcast teletext
services are subject to the Fairness Doctrine. 354 Recognizing the incon-
sistency and questionable constitutionality inherent in this result, the
TRAC court predicted that "the Supreme Court will one day revisit this
area of the law and either eliminate the distinction between print and
broadcast media, surely by pronouncing Tornillo applicable to both, or
announce a constitutional distinction that is more usable than the present
one."
355
Now would seem to be the time to revisit the TRAC "transmission
channel" approach, at least in its potential capacity as a general rationale
for justifying the regulation of electronic information services. Under the
349. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
350. Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
351. See. id. at 510.
352. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
353. See id. at 258.
354. See Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
355. Id. at 509.
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alternative "functional" approach, electronic information services would
not be regulated under broadcast or common carrier standards simply
because they transmit over television channels or phone lines. Instead,
EIS operators would be subject to several First Amendment standards,
depending on the different types of services that they provide and the
constitutional standard generally applied to each type and category of
service. As discussed earlier,356 this functional approach is already used
to some extent with cable television operators, who are considered First
Amendment speakers with respect to most of their channels, but who
function as common carriers toward the access channels that they are
required to provide under local franchising agreements or the commer-
cial access requirements of the Cable Communications Act of 1984. 3 "
To EIS operators, the main advantage of the functional approach is
that it is inherently flexible, permitting realistic regulatory schemes that
avoid the "strained reasoning and artificial results"'35 of the broad-brush
transmission channel approach. The main disadvantage is that this flexi-
bility and fluidity makes for less certainty than there is under the trans-
mission channel approach, where there is a single constitutional standard
derived solely from the nature of the transmission channel involved. For
most EIS operators, however, exchanging certainty for greater regulatory
flexibility would seem to be a trade that is well worth making.3" 9
In fact, this tradeoff should prove extremely attractive to most EIS
operators, since abandoning the transmission channel approach in favor
of a functional approach would effectively negate many of the rationales
that might justify more extensive government regulation of electronic in-
formation services. As already discussed, once you separate electronic
information services from the transmission channels over which they are
transmitted (that is, once you abandon the transmission channel ap-
proach to regulation), both the scarcity and intrusiveness rationales that
would justify imposing broadcaster-type regulations on EIS operators be-
356. See supra text accompanying notes 287-93.
357. See 47 U.S.C. § 532(b) (1988) (requiring cable systems of a certain size to set aside
channels for commercial access on a non-discriminatory basis); City of Los Angeles v.
Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) (program origination and se-
lection activities of cable operators plainly "implicate First Amendment interests"); Fed-
eral Communications Comm'n v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 n.9 (1979) ("A
cable system may operate as a common carrier with respect to a portion of its service
only."). Note that this functional, split-standard approach also seems implicit in recent
decisions allowing telephone companies to become providers, rather than mere retrans-
mitters, of information services. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
358. See Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
359. The downside to this approach is that it requires determining, in each case, which
capacity (publisher, distributor, etc.) the EIS operator was functioning in with respect to
the content at issue. However, once that factual determination is made, the constitu-
tional standard applied would remain constant across cases. For example, once a court
found that the EIS operator was functioning as a distributor toward an electronic mail
message, it would necessarily conclude that the operator could not be held liable for
defamatory statements contained in that message.
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come irrelevant.3" Similarly, once you reject the notion that electronic
information services simply pick up the regulatory characteristics of the
technology over which they are transmitted, there is nothing inherent in
the structure of electronic information services that would justify their
regulation as common carriers.
This brings us back to the point where the Cubby court started-ana-
lyzing the First Amendment status of electronic information services
from a purely functional perspective. From that perspective, it does
seem clear most EIS operators function as both publishers and distribu-
tors of information. When the EIS operator either creates or exercises
editorial control over information transmitted to subscribers, it is func-
tioning as a publisher. Conversely, when the EIS operator simply sup-
plies space on its system to third-party information providers, it is
functioning as a distributor. In both roles, the EIS operator is fully pro-
tected from government regulation of constitutionally protected speech
that it transmits to subscribers. In addition, in the Cubby court's opin-
ion, an EIS operator is also protected from liability for transmitting un-
protected speech (in Cubby, libelous statements made about a private
citizen) once the court determines that it functioned as a distributor,
rather than a publisher, of the speech in question.36'
As discussed earlier, this relief from liability for third-party content is
also available to common carriers (a category that includes cable opera-
tors that function as common carriers toward access channels), for whom
it is considered part of the tradeoff for the requirement that they provide
non-discriminatory access to third-party information providers.362 Thus,
this aspect of Cubby does raise the possibility of government regulation
that would require such non-discriminatory access to electronic informa-
tion systems in return for relieving EIS operators from liability for any
actionable content contained in the third-party materials that they trans-
mit (or, as is perhaps more likely, a regulatory or judge-made rule that
this exemption from liability is available only when the third party in
question has been the beneficiary of a common-carrier like access
policy). 363
With this one possible exception, however, adopting a functional ap-
proach to regulating electronic information services should benefit both
EIS operators and the public generally. EIS operators will benefit by
being freed from the many burdensome regulations that would restrict
their First Amendment rights and inhibit the growth of their services,
and that often seem to be applied to new media by blind and inappropri-
360. See supra text accompanying notes 306-11.
361. See Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
362. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
363. A rule mandating access to electronic information services is unlikely any time
soon, however, since EIS operators do not yet benefit from the natural or de facto monop-
oly position that is enjoyed by most common carriers and cable operators, and that is
usually considered a corollary condition for requiring communications media to provide
non-discriminatory access to their channels.
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ate analogy to existing communication systems. This regulatory ap-
proach should also work to the advantage of the American public, which
will benefit from the continued growth of electronic information services
that function both as independent editorial voices and as electronic fo-
rums for the free exchange of information and ideas provided by others.
CONCLUSION
As Justice Blackmun observed, when considering where a new com-
munications medium fits under the First Amendment, courts should first
determine whether the characteristics of the new technology "make it
sufficiently analogous to another medium to warrant application of an
already existing standard or whether those characteristics require a new
analysis. "" In the case of EIS systems, analogies to existing electronic
media are clearly insufficient. In particular, it would be a mistake to
assume that electronic information services should simply "pick up" the
regulatory characteristics of the more established media over which they
are transmitted, since this would result in inappropriate and burdensome
regulation that would work to restrict the First Amendment rights of
EIS operators and the growth of the electronic information industry. In-
stead, Congress and the courts should pursue a more functional ap-
proach that focuses on the type and scope of communications services
that EIS systems provide, the manner in which they operate, and their
role in the information marketplace in which they must compete. Under
this sort of analysis, EIS operators generally appear to warrant the full
level of First Amendment protection provided to print publishers and the
distributors of print publications.
364. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
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